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This study looks at Spinoza's physical and metaphysical theory of individuation. It tackles 
the status of an individual in Spinoza's system given his remark in the political writings 
that the state is “guided as if by one mind.” Focusing primarily on the Ethics, the study 
begins with his physical account of the individual, and then proceeds to the status of 
individuals in terms of mind. Following this, it examines the question of the state-as-
individual. Drawing from contemporary debates, the study focuses on three main 
accounts: the individualist, the communitarian, and the transindividual. This thesis argues 
that Spinoza's theory of individuation is neither libertarian nor strongly communitarian in 
the modern political tradition, which is to say that it neither favours the part nor the 
whole, but involves a constant flipping between both positions. The nature of Spinoza’s 
theory of individuation, then, is one that relies most fundamentally on relationality, 











 In chapter 3.2 of the Political Treatise (TP) Spinoza writes, “the right of the state 
of the sovereign is nothing more than the right of Nature itself and is determined by the 
power not of each individual but of a people which is guided as if by one mind.”1  
Spinoza uses both veluti and tanquam throughout the text; here he uses veluti for “as if.” 
This qualification has generated many controversies amongst Spinoza scholars. Is this use 
of “veluti” or “tanquam” to be understood metaphorically, literally, or as something more 
intricate? The controversy over how to read Spinoza’s qualification brings us to the heart 
of the central question of modernity: is the individual prior or a posteriori to the 
communal substance? Alternatively, has Spinoza found another way to think this 
either/or? Has he circumvented it, as he does with many other dualisms, by rethinking the 
distinction thought to exist between individuality and communal substance? I will 
demonstrate that we should read Spinoza's qualification as a rhetorical tool for working 
out his deeply complex metaphysical theory of individuation before I return to its 
implication for political and ethical thought. 
 Perhaps, at first glance, it seems that the seventeenth century Spinoza is not the 
philosopher one should turn to discuss politics. His project throughout the Ethics is to 
explain that God is nature, and further, that philosophic knowledge, and therefore 
happiness is to know and love this God that is nature. However, he began the TP by 
stating that he will:  
                                                            
1     TP, 3.2. 
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demonstrate by sure and conclusive reasoning … deducing them from human 
nature as it really is. And in order to enquire into matters relevant to this branch of 
knowledge in the same unfettered spirit as is habitually shown in mathematical 
studies, I have taken great care not to deride, bewail, or execrate human actions, 
but to understand them.2 
 
What he sought, in his investigation of politics, was to understand the ways that human 
societies work in virtue of their passions, and not despite them. That human society is 
natural, and neither good nor bad informs his desire to offer, on the one hand, the 
distinction between knowledge of the Holy Scriptures as obedience and natural 
knowledge as the free contemplation of God in the Theological-Political Treatise (TTP). 
On the other hand, he outlines what he takes to be the most optimal ways to govern in the 
TP. I take that his political project, as an extension of the Ethics, is to find the best ways 
to govern people and allow them the highest likelihood of following natural knowledge. 
In fact, these two aims often run hand in hand. 
In the TTP and TP Spinoza is perhaps the first author in modernity to argue for 
democratic forms of political authority. In the TTP, he rewrites Hobbes’ notion of the 
social contract to argue that individuals make a compact for the sake of their security. In 
the TP, Spinoza makes no mention of this contract, and many readers have been left to 
believe that he thinks that there is no abstract state of nature, but always a societas 
(association, or participation) in force prior to the making and unmaking of given states. 
These writings give rise to very diverse readings of Spinoza's politics.  
 I will cover two areas in the latter half of this thesis, the individualist and the 
collectivist version. What is at play, fundamentally, between these two readings is how 
different interpretations find, or do not find, Spinoza to fit the liberal tradition. The 
                                                            
2 TP 1,4. 
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individualist, which is to say liberal or libertarian, readings of Spinoza are those who read 
the veluti menti distinction as metaphor. I make no claim to be covering all theorists who 
fall into this camp, nor all the implications that follow for Spinoza’s philosophy, but focus 
primarily on the works of Steven Barbone and Lee Rice on the question of the veluit 
menti distinction.3 Barbone and Rice find that the individual is prior to the state, and 
further, that the state does not possess the metaphysical fundamentals to be an individual.  
If it did, the worry is that the rights of the state-as-individual would eclipse those of 
individual humans. The individualists, or as I later refer to them, the metaphorists, point 
to the TTP to argue that while individuals participate in the state, they possess a power 
(potentia) or natural right that does not submit or integrate to the state.4 Secondly, they 
point to the distinction between a singular thing and an individual. E2def7 tells us that a 
singular thing (res singulares) is the “cause of one effect.”5 And further, by E3p4: “no 
thing can be destroyed except by external cause,” and in the TP 6/6, “a commonwealth is 
always in greater danger from its citizens than from its enemies.” 6 Through these key 
parts of Spinoza’s texts they argue that the state must be a singular thing and not an 
individual since citizens that are internal to it can destroy it whereas a true individual 
cannot. 
The collectivists, who include Marxists and Anarchist readings of Spinoza, read 
                                                            
3    Isaiah Berlin (1969), for instance, condemned Spinoza because he took Spinoza to be putting the 
interests of the state above individual interests. This would cause problems for any liberal politics that 
would want to claim Spinoza as one of their fore fathers. 
4    TTP 17. 
5    E2def7. Here I will point out that, for Spinoza, a singular thing is, as mentioned above, that which has 
one cause. Particular things are, by E1p25col, “definite and determinate” modes in any attribute. Bodies, 
by E2p11def, are extended things. An individual, by E2p13def, is that which is united in one “unvarying 
relation” of motion and rest. 
6    E3p4, TP 6.6. 
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the qualification differently. Alexandre Matheron’s Individu et Communauté chez Spinoza 
is the most influential texts in this camp and has influenced many interpretations since 
then. Matheron argues that, by extension of E2p13def, the definition of an individual, we 
should think of political states as individuals. Matheron argues that individuals in the 
political state, just as simple bodies within a composite body (i.e. blood in the human 
body), retain their individuality despite being part of the state, thus satisfying the remarks 
in the TTP.7  Think, for example, of one’s own citizenship. I may be a citizen of Canada, 
and while the state may be its own individual, of which I am a part, I do not lose my 
individuality for being a part of that whole. An imperium as collective is always able to 
enact the power of both itself and of the state if moved from fear and so on. It is not 
entirely clear, on the literalist account, how the mind of the state functions, or what 
exactly it is, but Balibar offers an account, which I will take up, that it is a quasi-mind.8 
This mind, then, is something of a mind-like assemblage.  
Though I do not cover this political reading in depth of Spinoza below, it is 
important to note his impact on both feminist and ecological studies. Given the lack of 
absolute distinction between human and animals, some scholars believe Spinoza evinces 
an ecological thinking. His rigorous naturalist philosophy grants no special place to 
humanity and subjects all objects and beings to the same natural laws, and this has 
                                                            
7    This implies that the true anti-individualist readings are the idealist readings (including British 
Hegelianism and Neo-realism) of Spinoza that suggest human individuality is only an illusion. See, for 
example, Harold Henry Joachim (1901). 
8    Though I do not deal with this issue here, Jonathan Bennett (1984), notes that a state should be able to 
kill its citizens, just as the citizens should be able to dispose a state. This is because Spinoza does allow 
for the possibility of suicide at E4p20s in spite of the conatus doctrine. If a human individual can kill 
herself, then the constituents of a state should also be able to revolt and dispose of a state. 
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appealed to ecosophers.9 On the other hand, feminist interpretations have also celebrated 
elements of Spinoza’s thought. Against those forms of feminism that derive, through long 
interrogations and critique via Hegelian negativity, feminists such Moira Gatens, 
Genevieve Lloyd and Hasana Sharp, argue that Spinoza’s disavowal of certain 
dichotomies, such as mind/body, reason/emotion, freedom/necessity, leads to a thinking 
of activity that allows for a robust philosophy of becoming that is not based in any form 
of essentialism.10 
 I will begin with an investigation of Spinoza's metaphysical theory of 
individuation, drawing on what is commonly called in the literature the “physical 
interlude.”11 This “interlude” includes propositions 13 and 14 of the second book of the 
Ethics, “Of the Nature of the Origin of the Mind,” which focuses on the mind, the 
intellect, and ideas. These two propositions break the general theme of the second book 
by explaining the notion of the individual, or bodies, in terms of extension, rather than in 
terms of the mind. Spinoza's system claims to have many attributes, but the only two that 
are available to humans are mind and body. These are the two aspects of substance we 
can consider individuality through. These two propositions, then, shed considerable light 
on what Spinoza considers physical individuality. Despite focusing on the ontological 
status of bodies in his theory of individuation, Spinoza's theory is clearly not a reductive 
materialism. Spinoza's parallelism of the attributes of mind and body tells us that thought 
                                                            
9    For an introduction to this view, see Arne Naess (1973, 1980). 
10   For an introduction to this view, see especially Gaten’s collected volume on feminist interpretations of 
Spinoza (2009). 
11 At E2p13, Spinoza explains the mind/body union: “Nobody can really understand this union adequately, 
or distinctly, unless he first understands the nature of our body” (E2p13s) – therefore, we may say that 
understanding the physical will aide us in understanding the ideal. Anglo-American scholarship tends to 
read him as a physicalist, see Bennett (1984), and Gabbey (1996), whereas European scholars often read 
him as a non-physicalist, see Gueroult (1974) and Moreau (1994). 
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and extension are different expressions of the same substance, as evidenced by his remark 
at E2P7 where he states that the “order and connection of ideas is the same as the order 
and connection of things.”12 As such, we must be wary in our reading of physical 
individuality to avoid a theory of individuation that is exclusive to physical bodies. After 
all, if the people act as if by one mind, they also act as if by one body. The definition of 
an attribute – “what the intellect perceives of a substance, as constituting its essence” – 
read in conjunction with Spinoza's substance monism points us towards a theory of mode-
identity and individuation. Put differently, only the modes are that which are individuated 
in Spinoza’s metaphysics. Understanding this fact will help us to understand the 
importance of thinking individuation at the physical as well as at the level of the mind.13  
In chapter one, I give a brief overview of the foundations of Spinoza's substance 
ontology. In highlighting some differences between Spinoza and Descartes' metaphysics, 
I set the stage to discuss the position of individuation and the individual in Spinoza's 
system. As such, I begin with substance, the foundation of Spinoza's system, which is 
absolutely infinite and unitary.14 Following the geometrical method of the Ethics, which 
contains definitions that set the central terms of Spinoza's project, I proceed from the 
conception of substance to its attributes and modes. As my project here is not an analysis 
of the opening moves of the Ethics, I confine this chapter to a basic introduction to 
Spinoza's ontology. 
                                                            
12   E2p7. 
13 Idef4. 
14 There is debate in the literature whether we can say that Spinoza held God to be immutable. Pointing to 
E1p20c2 - “God, or all of God's attributes, are immutable” seems to say it all. Pierre Bayle (1991), in his 
entry on Spinoza, maintained, “the God of the Spinozists is a nature actually changing.” Jonathan 
Bennett (1984), Edwin Curley (1969, 1991), and Yitzak Melamed (2013) have all endorsed something 
similar, and therefore accept that Spinoza's God is, in fact, mutable. 
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 Chapter two examines the “physical interlude” in great detail. Looking both to the 
Ethics as well as contemporary secondary sources, I turn to the account of physical 
individuality. In doing so, I go through the three kinds of bodies that Spinoza introduces, 
the simple bodies, composite bodies, and composite bodies with composite parts. Further, 
I outline what bodies are in terms of motion and rest, fixed ratios, and the conatus, the 
latter of which is the “striving” that is the heart of every existing thing. What is at stake is 
a correct understanding of motion and rest, which I claim is best understood as two sides 
of two expressions of extension. Further, I argue that we cannot understand fixed ratios as 
strict mathematical ratios, but rather as the fluctuation and perseverance of said 
expressions of extension. Finally, the conatus provides a fundamental key to 
understanding this perseverance, from simple to complex, of the proper fixed ratio of the 
two expressions of extension. In doing so, I argue that there is an important distinction 
between individuation and individuality, which I detail in general terms in chapter three.15 
I argue that we maintain our individuality even as we are part of the whole, and moreover, 
that we cannot lose this individuality by some dissolution into the whole. However, from 
the point of view of adequate ideas, we can recognize that our individuation both is and is 
not. While we always retain our self-identity, we are also always part of greater wholes, 
all the way to the totality of substance. 
                                                            
15    Though I return to this distinction in chapter three, here I will say that individuality is that which any 
particular thing has if it has a conatus. There is a desire to preserve within that identity, we could say. 
Individuation, on the other had, is that which marks us apart from other singular things. The most 
adequate our reasoning is, which is to say the closer we come to the third kind of knowledge, the more 
we realize that being individuated one from the other is a limited way of understanding reality from the 
point of view of the finite, or Duration, instead of through infinite Substance, or Eternity. For example, 
that I see myself as separate from my neighbor in the sense that I think I am autonomous and self-
directing is incorrect insofar as we both participate in Substance, at both the physical and ideational 
level. 
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 In chapter three, I further the arguments from chapter two by discussing the 
implications of the physical account in the “physical interlude” for the attribute of 
thought. It is my contention that, in a similar fashion, ideas are individuated, just as 
bodies are. To make this clear, I start with a consideration of what Spinoza means by the 
inadequate and adequate ideas. Inadequate ideas are the result of sense-based forms of 
cognition, and while Spinoza does not denigrate sense-based knowledge, as it is important 
for many of our faculties, he nevertheless maintains it is the source of all error. Adequate 
knowledge, on the other hand, relies on our inter-subjectivity by which we can guarantee 
that the ideas that we share represent something in nature, and thus underlies the so-called 
“common notions.”16 In paying attention to the distinction between inadequate and 
adequate ideas, I argue that we can demonstrate the key difference in the way we should 
approach individuation and individuality in Spinoza's system. Pointing out this difference 
depends on a robust understanding of the conatus. The ability of a thing to maintain its 
individuality in the face of the decreasing individuation of adequate knowledge is 
precisely dependent upon that individual's conatus. 
 Following these discussions, I extend my focus from the metaphysical to the 
political in chapter four. In doing so, I examine the implications of Spinoza's theory of 
individuation in light of his remarks in the TP. In light of the metaphysical background of 
Spinoza's theory of individuation, I search for answers to the above questions. To do so, I 
turn to three areas of contemporary scholarship on this qualification, staying close to 
                                                            
16    It is worth noting that we can all have commonality in our ideas with those ideas that are clear and 
distinct. For example, we can all possess the idea of a triangle in our heads; disagreement arises when 
we try to “translate” that idea outward to one another. Say, for instance, that I draw a triangle that, 
despite my best attempt to translate it from my idea, looks more like a square. Presumably, my peers 
would disagree with what I have given to be a triangle because it does not match the adequate idea of a 
triangle in their minds, which we do share, despite my poor attempt at drawing it. 
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Spinoza's texts in order to parse out different interpretations. 
 Chapter five focuses on the individualist, collectivist, and transindividual readings 
of the qualification in the TP. The writings of Steven Barbone and Lee Rice read 
Spinoza’s veluti qualification as metaphorical, insisting that Spinoza intends his readers to 
understand that the state only appears to act as if an individual, when, in fact, it does not 
possess a conatus or a unified body. The collectivist tradition, which includes such 
figures as Alexandre Matheron and Pierre-Francois Moreau, advocates a literal reading of 
the qualification. The people, or the multitude, have one soul. The notion of an ensouled 
multitude is cashed out in terms of the conatus of the state, or in terms of the collective 
passions and ideas of a people. It is my contention that both readings overlook the 
fundamental inter-connection of individuals. As such, I turn to Etienne Balibar's 
transindividualist account. Drawing from Gilbert Simondon, Balibar argues that 
individuation, both in metaphysical and political terms, is “always already” in progress 
and applies equally to bodies as to souls, ideas and political movements.17 Moreover, all 
social action is always one of both interaction and circumstance, which is to say that an 
individual is comprised of herself, her relations with others, and the exact milieu in which 
she finds herself. Ultimately, I argue that, for Spinoza, the state is neither not an 
individual, nor is it one. I endorse a Balibarian notion of a quasi-individual state that is 
transindividual. At the end of this chapter, I argue for the importance of studying 
Spinoza’s politics to tackle some of the most pressing political concerns today, for 
instances, issues of exclusion and representation and normative political platforms versus 
                                                            
17   For Simondon’s account of the transinividual, which he denies is Spinozistic despite Balibar’s claims, 
see Gilbert (1958, 1964, and 1989). 
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utopic thinking. My thesis is that our current political vocabulary does not allow us to 
understand Spinoza — even 400 years later since we are still stuck in this dualism of self 
and community, and Balibar’s account provides one vision of what Spinoza could have 





 Spinoza begins, most famously, from substance – Deus Sive Natura – which 
expresses the two known attributes of extension and thought. Spinoza does certainly not 
introduce the conception of substance. The philosophical study of substance has a long 
and rich history from Ancient Greek thinkers, such as Aristotle to medieval scholars, such 
as Aquinas, to Spinoza's near contemporary, Descartes. In fact, it is the case that a great 
deal of Spinoza's own formulation of his conception of substance is in response to what 
he found to be problematic in Descartes’ conception. 
 While Spinoza is meticulous regarding definitions in the Ethics, we can easily see 
that he takes up a lot of traditional terminologies, both from Descartes and the scholastics, 
only to redefine and rework it. There are many places throughout his corpus where he 
seems to be arguing in one way, but is, in fact, arguing in another. In my current 
investigation, this is of particular importance. Spinoza is, in fact, notorious for using 
traditional terms in completely different ways and thus is often misread for this reason. 
Therefore, it is of utmost importance to unpack some of his metaphysical terminologies 
before we can begin to tackle how this will affect his political writings. 
 In this chapter, I give a brief synopsis of Cartesian substance ontology in an effort 
to contextualize Spinoza's point of departure. Following this brief look at Descartes, I 
give a global exegesis of Spinoza's metaphysical system, focusing on substance, 
attributes, and modes. Here, the intention is to be concise and, like Spinoza himself 
declares, to set the stage to “consider human actions and appetites just as if it were a 
 12 
question of lines, planes, and bodies.”18 While my overarching questions are less about 
human capriciousness, or the geometrical method, than they are with investigating the 
individual vis-à-vis the whole.  
 
1.1 Substance 
 Modeled on the classical presentation of geometry derived from Euclid's 
Elements, written circa 300 B.C.E, Spinoza wrote his Ethics in a deductive geometrical 
style and, as such, it is not what one would call inviting. This form of presentation is a 
synthetic style that proceeds from causes to effects and also draws from Aristotelian 
science.19 As opposed to induction, which begins with effects and moves towards their 
causes, his deductive style allows him to begin with 1) the thing, God (cause), that 
explains other things and, then proceed to 2) the things that are being explained (effect).20 
It is God that comes first in the casual order of things; man and other entities follow from 
and depend on God. While utilizing the geometrical method in the seventeenth century 
was not uncommon, Spinoza himself called it “cumbersome,” and it has been suggested 
that he paused to write the Political-Theological Treatise during the time he was writing 
the Ethics, in part, to demonstrate his work in a more accessible format.21  
 In one of his earliest works, The Emendation of the Intellect, Spinoza notes that 
“the most perfect Method will be the one that shows how the mind is to be directed 
according to the standard of the given idea of the most perfect Being,” and further that to 
                                                            
18 E3Pref. 
19 The Aristotelian notion that true knowledge, or science, is knowledge of causes. For instance, see, 
Posterior Analytics 71 b 9-11, 94 a 20, Physics II/3 and Metaphysics V/2. 
20 R.S. Woolhouse, Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz. (New York: Routledge, 1993), 30-31. 
21 4p18s. Jonathan Israel, The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness and Fall, 1477-1806 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 1998), chapter 1. See also Israel (2001). 
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understand this Being, or Nature, our mind must  
reproduce completely the likeness of Nature; it must bring all of its ideas forth 
from that idea which represents the source and origin of the whole of Nature, so 
that the idea is also the source of the other ideas.22 
 
What the Ethics tells us is that the primary Being, Deus Sive Natura, is the totality of the 
universe, and further, it is this being that causally determines all others. Spinoza’s 
determinism is among the basic premises of his system, and it is also the structure of his 
argument in the Ethics; all depends on God, so all that is follows from God. Every 
proposition, axiom, and demonstration reflects this dependence. 
Both Descartes and Spinoza drew heavily on their scholastic predecessors, such as 
Aquinas. For the scholastics, substance is not identical with existence, and further, it 
possesses properties that are contingent and therefore not essential. Substances are that 
which exist not for, or by, another subject, and as such, there can be many substances, for 
example, humans, cows, and trees. Descartes largely dismissed this constituent ontology 
in favour of a substance that is an independent being that exists on its own without being 
a modification of any other being.23 Unlike the scholastic tradition, Descartes argued that 
there are only two basic kinds of real substances, mind and body.24 Substances, he 
thought, are self-subsisting things that have principle attributes that are not shared by each 
other (excepting duration). These two principles give us the two basic kinds of substance: 
the attribute of Mind is thought (res cogitans), and the attribute of Body is extension (res 
extensa).25  
                                                            
22 Em, 38, Em, 42. 
23 Meditations on First Philosophy, Mediation 3. 
24 I say “basic” here because, strictly speaking, there is only one substance for Descartes as well, and that 
is God. See Principles of Philosophy, 1/51. 
25 PP, 1/51-53.  
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 Moreover, these attributes are directly tied to the essence of the substances. Purely 
physical laws govern body, and further, it is always divisible. Extended nature is 
separable at any point, or points, along its extension. Mind, however, is never divisible.26 
For instance, the human body can lose limbs (up to a point), but the thinking mind cannot. 
The basic Cartesian ontology also includes modes, which are determined by their 
attributes. Despite the fact that modes depend on their attributes for a thing to exist, it 
must possess modifications.27 For example, Descartes writes that there are many modes of 
thought such as “understanding, imagination, memory, [and] volition.”28 For extension 
this includes numbers, universals, and “different shapes, lay-out of parts and movements 
of parts,” such as running.29 
 For Spinoza, there is only one infinite substance, and it is self-caused, eternal, and 
primary, and this substance is called God, or Nature.30 Not only is substance self-caused, 
but it is also “conceived through itself,” which places severe restrictions on interaction 
between things as causal necessity dictates all relations.31 Causal interaction, therefore, 
would be impossible between two substances that cannot share attributes or produce a 
change in each other.32 Because of this, substance is said to be both infinite and unitary. 
The question naturally arises, then, how do we explain what appears to be the interaction 
of Aristotelian-like substances that take place around us all the time? Spinoza's answer is 
relatively simple and breathtaking in its effects – finite things that interact are not 
                                                            
26 MFP, Mediation 6. 
27 PP 1/56, 58, 64-65. 
28   MFP, Mediation 3-4. 
29 Ibid.  
30 E1def1-3, E1def6, E1p29s, E4pref. 
31 E1def3, Ep1a3. 
32 E1def3, p2, p14. See also the correspondence between Oldenburg and Spinoza, letters 2-4. 
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substances. They are modifications of God, which is to say the properties of God.33 I will 
return, below, to the modes. 
 Spinoza maintains that reality flows from the essence of God in infinitely many 
ways; from God the rest of the universe emanates. The language of emanation is, of 
course, conceptual because it is always already taking place, and so any discussion of 
God should not mistake God for a reified thing over and against the modes or things it 
produces. Emanation here is not meant in a Neo-Platonic sense, but that Spinoza uses it 
here for an immanent understanding of substance, not in its usual transcendental meaning. 
All that takes place is part of a coherent whole, which is God or nature. In this way, we 
can make sense of Spinoza's remarks at Ep15, “everything that is, is in God,” as well as 
his substance monism, which is anything but static: God or Nature is, simply put, the 
being of becoming. For Spinoza, being does not transcend becoming but is immanent to 
it.  
 However, God also expresses infinitely many attributes, each of which is also 
infinite and unlimited, as discussed below. Though human beings can access only two of 
these attributes, thought and extension, they are two aspects of the totality of nature. They 
are expressions of nature, which is itself both extended and available to thought. From the 
attributes follow the infinite immediate modes – infinite intellect and motion and rest – 
and the infinite immediate modes – truth and the total face of the universe.34 Finally, the 
finite modes, or particular thoughts and actions, proceed from the immediate and mediate 
                                                            
33 E1p5-8. 
34 E1p28, E2p13s, Letter 64 and 66. In these letters, Spinoza only provides an example of an infinite 
immediate mode in the attribute of extension. There is a large body of literature written on this topic, to 
enter the debate sees: Jonathan Bennett (1991), Edwin Curley and Gregory Walski (1999), Charles 
Huenemann (1999), and Yitzhak Melamed (2010). 
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modes. Every mode is determined to be as it is through divine essence. The world is as it 
must be; it could not have been otherwise.35 
 What exactly are attributes and modes, and what do they do in Spinoza's system? 
They flow from God's essence and are causally determined, but how are they also 
expressions of difference within unity, that is, how does Spinoza avoid the Hegelian night 
in which all cows are black? Similar to Descartes' conception of the material world, 
Spinoza maintains that extension is modified by degrees of motions and rest (which I will 
return to in Chapter II). This modification produces the face of the universe and all of the 
particular, finite physical events or actions that are the modes of extension happening in 
time. Thought, which is modified by the infinite intellect, produces mind, which 
encompasses all of the particular, finite mental events, which is to say ideas. In other 
words, we should not be led to think of God in the same way as, say Aquinas does, as 
some reified “mind” or divine mens, but as being made up from the finite particular ideas 
(or properties), in the case of thought. 
 Ep2p7 tells us “the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and 
connection of things,” and, further, the causally independent attributes proceed in parallel. 
However, it would hinder our understanding here to think of them happening 
concurrently, for they are not really parallel, as habitually discussed, but are the same 
thing.36 Substance, then, is its attributes. These attributes are its determinate essence, but 
the modes within a given attribute do not influence each other.37 That said it is important 
                                                            
35 E1p33. 
36 E2p7schol. 
37 Attributes also furnish us with a way of substance being an Eleatic “one,” of which nothing can be said 
or known. 
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to bear in mind that for every object of the natural world that exists as a mode of the 
attribute of extension, there is a corresponding idea in the mind of God that exists as a 
mode of the attribute of thought. 
 While Spinoza rejects Cartesian dualism, he does endorse Descartes' rejection of 
atomism. For both philosophers, this rejection of atomism leads them to conclude that 
there is no ultimate particle. There is nothing that everything can be reduced to as we find 
in Epicurus or Lucretius.38 Descartes endorses a corpuscularianism according to which 
God's ability to think of distinct material units as infinitely divisible makes that division 
possible.39 While Spinoza's discussion in the “physical interlude” evokes the language of 
Epicurean atomism, one should not mistake his parallelism for the latter’s positions. He 
accepted corpuscularianism on a material and scientific basis; however, all simple bodies 
are the objects of mind, rather than something created by the mind. 
 In part two of the Ethics Spinoza examines the human mind and its ideas. 
Importantly, he discusses this through explicit reference to the body. Ideas perfectly 
represent parts of the body, human or otherwise. E2p18 tells us that we are often ignorant 
of ideas, and, further, do not know their bodily correlate. While the many implications 
and problems of parallelism are a fascinating issue, it is only useful for us at this juncture 
to understand Spinoza's basic ontology. Here, as noted above, it is important only to 
understand that Spinoza's attributes run in parallel. 
 In this first chapter I have given a very basic outline of Spinoza's metaphysics in 
                                                            
38   Interestingly, atomism is frequently attributed to the ancient Greeks, most notably in the works of 
Democritus, but there was evidence of atomist philosophies in both Indian and Islamic schools around 
the same time. It appears to be the case that the Islamic atomism is a hybrid of Greek and Indian. See 
McEvilley (2001), Gangopadhyaya (1981), and van Melsen (1952) for most historiographical detail. 
39 Pr. II, 20. 
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terms of substance, attributes, and modes. Once more, they have been delivered rather 
quickly to allow us smoother sailing through the sea of ideas of substance in which 
Spinoza found himself at the time. Undoubtedly, a project to give a fairer and more 
charitable reading to his metaphysics would require space not available to me here. My 
goal in this chapter has been to provide an account of Spinoza’s basic system before I 
begin to unpack it in great detail. In providing this account, a few things have come to 
light that are important to bear in mind. Most fundamentally it has been shown that 
Spinoza’s metaphysics is a monist one. For my purposes, this is important, as it demands 
further investigation of the part-whole distinction. What is the question of individuation 
but this distinction? The first step, as I see it, to begin to explore individuation is through 
the attributes. To that end, the next two chapters begin to explore Spinoza’s theory of 






 In the previous chapter, I have demonstrated Spinoza's basic substance ontology in 
Part I of the Ethics. With this framework in mind, I turn to an analysis of his theory of 
individuation. It is my contention that both individuation and individuality are central 
concepts for understanding Spinoza's ethical and political thought. However, we cannot 
begin to examine his remarks on the nature of the individuality of the state in the Political 
Treatise properly until we have covered the physical and metaphysical elements of these 
concepts. I believe it is important to proceed from the physical account of individuation to 
understanding individuality as that which is dependent on adequate ideas. It is only after a 
thorough investigation of individuation and individuality that we can continue to the 
ethical and political implications of both. This chapter begins with Spinoza’s physical 
account of individuation. Unfortunately, Spinoza did not leave a clear theory of 
individuation or individuality, nor did he use this differentiation explicitly. There are 
remarks scattered throughout his corpus that shed light on individuation and individuals, 
and I can turn to Part II of the Ethics for the foundation of his theory.  
 In this chapter, I focus on a close reading of proposition thirteen, and its scholia, 
axioms, definition, lemmas and postulates. My intention here is to articulate clearly 
Spinoza's definition of physical bodies and individuation. As such, I begin with axioms 
1'- 2', lemmas 1-3, and axioms 1"-2", which are interested in simple bodies (corpus 
simplicissima). Following looking at the simple bodies, I turn to the definition, axiom 3", 
and lemmas 4-7, which concern composite bodies (corporibus componitur). Finally, I 
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turn to the scholium of lemma 7, and postulates 1-6, which concern the human body 
(corpus humanum), or composite bodies with composite parts (individuum compositum). 
After examining the “physical interlude,” I turn to sections outside the “physical 
interlude” to form a complete picture of individuation, with a focus on the doctrine of the 
conatus, before closing with a look at the general scope of the theory of individuation. 
 While Spinoza rejects Cartesian dualism in favour of a substance monism, 
however, unlike Descartes, Spinoza holds that this extended network of bodies has 
another expression in the attribute of thought (and presumably all other unknown 
attributes), without the two being separate. It is interesting that Spinoza chose, in light of 
this, to explain individuation in physical terms as there is a danger to read an over-
reliance on the physical into his account of individuation. In choosing to follow Spinoza 
in demonstrating individuation via the attribute of extension, I presuppose a few things. 
The first is that we ought to understand the interlude as a trans-attributal explanation. By 
way of explaining this claim I presuppose, secondly, that what is at offer in the interlude 
is not a robust account of physics, nor was that Spinoza’s intent. Rather, the language of 
the attribute of extension is a linguistic placeholder for any attribute of substance. That 
this is the case will become significant as we shift from the language of extension in 
chapter two to that of mind in chapter three. Here, though, I will say that in the Treatise 
on the Emendation of the Intellect Spinoza claims that we must do all we can “to 
reproduce the formal character of nature, both as to the whole and as to the parts.”40 The 
aim is to possess an adequate idea of God, or Nature’s, essence and were this essence 
deducible from a merely physical account the issue would not be so grave. Bodies 
                                                            
40 TIE, 91. 
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themselves share common properties with their causes within the attribute of extension, 
and this becomes a problem if we want to give an account of said bodies outside of the 
physical. When it bumps into a chair I know that my body, via my everyday participation 
in the physical world and my subsequent sense experience, causes the chair to move. That 
is to say I know it bodily. As such, finally, I presuppose that this provides me with part of 
the project of knowing, bodily, God’s essence. It does not, however, provide me with any 
information about God’s essence in any other attribute. Because of this, I suspect we 
ought to think of it as applicable to other attributes when reading the interlude.  
 
2.1 Simple Bodies 
 Spinoza's demonstration for his physics is not a priori. As opposed to the 
deductive method of the first part of the Ethics, the opening moves of the “physical 
interlude” are empirical in nature. Put in simple terms, this echoes the example above: I 
know, from empirical experience what happens when my body bumps a chair. 
Throughout the interlude, the reader gets the sense that she is being presented with a 
different account of the nature of substance. Axiom 1' and 2' tell us, “all bodies either 
move or are at rest,” and that they move at various speeds. Bodies are, as Spinoza notes in 
lemma 1, “distinguished from one another by reason of motion and rest, speed and 
slowness, and not by reason of substance.”41 This is to say, bodies are not discrete 
substances themselves, but rather they are modified extended nature. The action and 
existence of bodies are co-extensive in that they both exist and are active as part of their 
                                                            
41  E2p13lem1. 
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nature and adherence in their attribute.42 Further, there is no neutral state of materiality; 
everything is constantly in a union of motion and rest. In this union bodies determine 
each other to motion or rest; bodies are thus affected in a variety of different ways by a 
variety of different bodies, and are distinguished from each other only by these reasons.43 
That is, each body is in a web of relations and its specificity derives from where (as 
bodies are always in both space and time) in this web it falls. This much is clear from a 
basic understanding of Spinoza's ontology. 
 However, Spinoza is not always clear what he means by motion and rest (motus et 
quietis). Don Garrett notes that Spinoza most often treats motion and rest in a relatively 
ordinary way, that is to say, as two different characteristics of particular bodies or 
individuals, which consist in their respective change or retention of spatial relations.44 In 
the Short Treatise Spinoza speaks of motion and rest as being possible without particular 
things, and, therefore, implies that these are two characteristics of the attribute of 
extension, rather than the qualities of modes.45 If motion and rest distinguish bodies 
metaphysically, then how can they be characteristics of said bodies? This would seem to 
denote a world that is homogenous with no variety in time or space.46 Looking at 
Spinoza's divergences with Cartesian views on substance helps to articulate a meaningful 
sense in which motion and rest function to differentiate individuals. Varying degrees of 
                                                            
42  E2p13lem2. 
43 E2p13lem3 ax1,” ax2.” Wolfson and Rice argue that this lemma is an exposition of Descartes' PP II, 37 
and is a precursor to Newton's First Law of Motion. See Harry Wolfson, The Philosophy of Spinoza. 
(New York, Meridian. 1958), 68. See also Lee Rice “Spinoza on Individuation” The Monist. (1971), 
645.  
44 Don Garrett, “Spinoza's Theory of Metaphysical Individuation,” Individuation in Early Modern 
Philosophy, eds. Kenneth F. Barber and Jorge J.E. Gracia (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1994), 78. 
45 As quoted in Garrett, “Spinoza's Theory of Metaphysical Individuation,” 79. 
46 Ibid, 79. 
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motion and rest are distributed differentially throughout the attribute of extension, and, 
therefore, are the cause of differentiation in extension.47  
 Within the attribute of extension, matter is mechanical, as it was for Descartes, but 
it is also constant and changing only as quantities of motion and rest themselves change, 
that is, they are measurable.48 Lemmas 1 and 2, discussed above, demonstrate that 
different bodies consist in just these different ratios of motion and rest. They agree in 
attribute, as in they remain in extension, but differ in the quantitative ratios of motion and 
rest. Further, Spinoza writes, “a body which moves or is at rest must be determined to 
motion or rest by another body ... and so on, to infinity.”49 As such, there is no neutral 
state; the quantitative difference in motion and rest involves constant internal change. 
Moreover, motion and rest is itself the basis of differentiation within extension, but this 
does not mean that there would be motion without bodies for the two must always go 
together. There can be extension without motion, but no individual bodies without 
motion. Every physical thing has, or is, different ratios of motion and rest and is always 
changing as these ratios change. 
 Simple bodies make up compound individuals, and as individuals they must 
maintain a fixed ratio of motion and rest to remain that individual. The body “of an 
individual ... is composed of a number of bodies,” and “furthermore, the individual so 
composed retains its nature, whether it, as a whole, moves or is at rest, or whether it 
                                                            
47 Don Garrett, “Spinoza's Theory of Metaphysical Individuation,” 80. This is Garrett’s idea of 
“differential distribution.” 
48   From a theological or vitalistic interpretation of Spinoza, equating the infinite immediate mode, which is 
to say the particular attribute of extension, with mechanism could be seen as problematic. Indeed, that 
Spinoza was a mechanist may be quite contentious, however it is becomes rather plain from his 
correspondence with Robert Boyle, via Oldenburg (most notably letter 6). This, however, is not the 
question I intend to answer here, but I take it that he is. 
49 E2p13lem3. 
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moves in this direction, or that, so long as each part retains its motion and communicates 
it, as before, to the other.”50 Simple bodies may be seen as something of a subset, or an 
anti-atomistic building block, of individuation. While they are simple, they are more in 
line with a corpuscular material view of extension than an atomistic one.  While 
corpuscularianism is similar to the theory of atomism in that it posits particles, atomism 
argues they are indivisible, but corpuscles can in principle be divided. Spinoza's simple 
bodies are, therefore, corpuscles. 
 Alexandre Matheron argues that simple bodies are pure events (évenements pur) 
that take place in time and space, and are only defined by their external relationships.51  
Their essence impels them to retain their motion, however, doing so necessitates that they 
change the motion of another simple body. On Matheron's interpretation, this entails their 
death because, since they are simple, this change in motion and rest fundamentally 
changes them.52 Remember that Spinoza does not tell his reader much about the nature of 
simple bodies, other than they are in motion and rest and can move at varying speeds. 
Matheron argues that simple bodies ought to be thought of as composite individuals 
composed of only one part, where a single part is its unique ratio, and there is evidence 
for his claim. Spinoza writes that there is “none more excellent than those which agree 
entirely with our nature. For if, for example, two individuals of entirely the same nature 
are joined to one another, they compose an individual twice as powerful as each one.”53 
With this in mind, it makes sense that Matheron claims that if a simple body shares 
                                                            
50 E2p13lem4, E2p13lem7. 
51   This much is plain from Ep2p13a2''. 
52   Alexandre Matheron Individu et communauté chez Spinoza (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1988), 27. Unless 
otherwise noted, all quotes from Matheron are my own translation. 
53   Ep4p18s. 
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exactly the same motion and rest at the same speed with another simple body they will 
form another simple body together that is continuous and homogenous.54 This to say that 
the simple bodies that deflect one another, or change each other’s motion and rest do not 
agree entirely in nature, and are, therefore, separate individuals. Moreover, we can infer 
that simple bodies cannot change direction because to do so would change their speed, 
and, therefore, change them into another simple body.  
 I have demonstrated that the first three lemmas of the “physical interlude” show 
that the ratios of motion rest are quantitative, speed affects the body, and that causality is 
immanent in extension (that can be generalized to say that causality is immanent in each 
attribute), but what is a simple body? Simple bodies are the basic pieces of extended 
matter, “and the changing positions ... of these simple bodies might be constituted simply 
by the changing distributions of these homogenized in the force of motion-and-rest.”55 
The particular quantities of motion and rest in simple bodies can and do change through 
time and space via speed and size. Motion and rest, which are the two ways to understand 
extended substance (attribute), allow us to distinguish particular bodies (as modes) from 
one another. It can also be helpful to think of what simple bodies are not. It is tempting 
for the contemporary reader of Spinoza to equate simple bodies with something roughly 
akin to atoms. However, as mentioned above, Spinoza is not an atomist. Spinoza’s 
Cartesian physics renders any talk of atoms inconsistent. In the Principles of Cartesian 
Philosophy Spinoza clearly states that there are no atoms and that the true nature of 
                                                            
54   Matheron, Individu et communauté chez Spinoza, 27. 
55 Garrett, “Spinoza's Theory of Metaphysical Individuation,” 81. See also Jonathan Bennett (1984) and 
Valtteri Viljanen (2007). 
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matter is that it is infinitely divisible, while atoms are by their very nature indivisible.56 
The simple bodies, therefore, cannot be absolutely simple in any atomistic sense. The 
nature of the simple individuals has to do with their much more limited ratio of motion 
and rest, their limited ability to speed up or slow down, and their ability to withstand 
change. If any other simple body changes another's ratio, it ceases to be. For every simple 
individual must be able to maintain its ratio of motion and rest, and its speed. Any 
changes to those, at the level of simple bodies, change it into a new individual. 
Ultimately, I will argue that Spinoza is also politically anti-atomist as well, once we turn 
to the political writings in chapters four and five. I take it that this anti-atomism is derived 
from his metaphysical anti-atomism first articulated via simple bodies.  
 
2.2 Composite Bodies with Simple Parts 
 Thus far, Spinoza's theory of individuation involves the understanding that there 
are simple bodies, which are individuals in their own right, and are only distinguished 
from one another through motion and rest and speed. These simple bodies can move at 
varying speeds, and further, can be different shapes and sizes, but, importantly, they are 
not atoms. How do these simple bodies, then, compose more complex individuals? If 
Matheron is correct, then simple bodies themselves already compose into other simple 
bodies, so we must ask how simple bodies joining together from the same nature 
eventually progress to a new level of individual. The composite body, this next level, is 
                                                            
56   PP2p5. It is important to note that the Principles are not Spinoza’s own philosophical opinions, 
however, there is a great deal of evidence throughout the letters, most notably in the exchanges between 
Spinoza and Boyle on the nitre experiments, that Spinoza followed Descartes in believing there was no 
vacuum. 
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the next subject in the “physical interlude.” Beginning with the definition, encompassing 
axiom 3" and lemmas 4-7, including their various demonstrations and scholia, a picture of 
the composite body with simple parts emerges. The first provisional definition of an 
individual occurs in the definition, in E2p13. This tells us that  
When a number of bodies, whether of the same or of different size, are so 
constrained by other bodies that they lie upon one another, or if they so move, 
whether with the same degree or different degrees of speed, that they 
communicate their motions to each other in a certain fixed manner, we shall say 
that those bodies are united with one another and that they all together compose 
one body or individual (corpus sive individuum), which is distinguished from the 
others by this union of bodies.57 
 
If there are many bodies, regardless of size, that have contact through pressure, or move 
at the same or varying speeds, and share a certain pattern, then these smaller bodies 
compose one body. This body is itself distinguished from other bodies by its own ratio of 
motion and rest. It is crucial, if somewhat mystifying, that these composite bodies possess 
a certain fixed ratio of motion and rest. I return to this below. For now, let us continue to 
unpack Spinoza's account of the composite individual with simple parts. 
 Axiom 3" details the differences between hard, soft, and fluid bodies. Hard bodies 
“lie upon one another in a large surface,” soft bodies over a small surface and fluid bodies 
have parts that are continually in motion.58 These, then, represent the three types of 
composite bodies that exist for Spinoza. Further, he makes it clear that composite bodies 
with composite parts can often be made up of all three types. Lemmas 4 through 7 state 
that an individual, of any type, can retain its nature if some of its parts are replaced, lost, 
                                                            
57 Spinoza's use of the sive is important and perplexing. It is used to indicate the systematic identity or 
equivalence between two things, yet suggests a difference in terminology. It is clear that does not 
indicate a mere equivalence, nor it is a disjunctive. One way of reading sive, which seems plausible to 
me is that what follows the sive is meant to be a fuller account of the term that precedes it. 
58   E2p13ax3". 
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or accumulated. They may also retain their nature if they alter their motion so long as 
they keep the same ratio of motion and rest and communicate that ratio among their parts. 
The scholium of lemma 7 notes, 
 We now understand that an individual can be affected in a great many other ways, 
and still preserve its nature because it is composed of different parts that can 
withstand change or can be replaced to the same effect.59 
 
 Therefore, it is the relation of the parts to the whole in their constancy that creates 
the individual; this is how Spinoza deals with the mereology of parts and wholes. This is 
not to say that for Spinoza individuals are static and unchanging, in fact, it is the opposite. 
A complex individual's internal ratios of motion and rest change all the time as different 
bodies speed up or slow down, become hot or cold; the notion of identity is applied to a 
fixed ratio. Speaking of identity in this manner is appealing as it allows for a particular 
identity over time, but we need to address what a fixed ratio is. However, on this issue 
Spinoza is rather silent. As seen above, Spinoza does not give a precise explication of 
motion and rest in his system. Therefore, determining what the identity of a particular 
thing is becomes quite difficult. 
 Some commentators have suggested that the ratio of motion and rest be a 
mathematical ratio reflecting the measurements of motion and rest in both parts and 
whole that would make a thing's identity the mathematical sum of its ratios.60 Matheron 
claims that the ratio reflects the total motion of an individual who is composed of many 
different motions of which only some are relevant to the total sum, or, put differently, 
                                                            
59   E2p13lem7s. 
60 See David Lachterman (1997) and Martial Gueroult (1997), especially chapter 6. 
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only some of the part's ratios are subject to the total sum of a thing’s individuality.61 
Some have also argued that we must not define ratio itself as strictly mathematical. For 
instance, Samuel Shirley and R.H.M. Lewes explain Spinoza’s conception of a certain 
fixed pattern of motion and rest as relation and H. White and A.H. Sterling translate it as 
a “kind of motion and rest.”62 Jonathan Bennett describes it as a sort of coherence,63 and 
Barbone describes it as a certain pattern.64 
 However, Spinoza writes in the preface to the second part of the Short Treatise on 
God, Man and his Well-Being that  
If such a body has and preserves its proportion - say of 1 to 3 - the soul and the 
body will be like ours now are; they will, of course, be constantly subject to 
change, but not to such a great change that it goes beyond the limits of from 1 to 3 
... But if other bodies act on ours with such force that the proportion of motion (to 
rest) cannot remain 1 to 3, that is death, and a destruction of the soul… of a body65 
 
This text does seem to support the position that the ratio of motion and rest is a strictly 
mathematical one. This text points us to the conclusion that there is a specific 
mathematical ratio of bodies, and hence of ideas as well, that needs to remain constant at 
the risk of destruction or death. The example be taken to mean that the simple bodies that 
compose a more complex body must maintain a 1:3 ratio, and the whole body, or 
individual, must also hold a total ratio of 1:3. This section seems to provide relatively 
clear evidence that this mathematical ratio is indeed what Spinoza means when he says 
that the composite individuals have a fixed ratio. 
 However, Garrett has two objections to the claim that the ratio is a strictly 
                                                            
61 Matheron, Individu et communauté chez Spinoza, 38-43. 
62 Garrett, “Spinoza's Theory of Metaphysical Individuation,” 86. 
63 Jonathan Bennett, Spinoza's Ethics, (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1984), 232. 
64 Barbone, “What Counts as an Individual for Spinoza?” Ed. Olli Koistinen and J.I. Biro, Spinoza: 
Metaphysical Themes, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 91. 
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mathematical one.66 First, there is textual evidence in the Principles of Cartesian 
Philosophy as well as in lemma 7 and axiom 2' that counters the strict mathematical 
analysis. Spinoza states that when the body is determined to move by another body that 
first body's movement increases and its rest decreases, which changes its ratio.67 Lemma 
7, following from axiom 2', demonstrates that the body can “retain its nature ... so long as 
each part retains its motion,” such that the acceleration may take place so long as the ratio 
remains the same.68 Garrett is right, I believe, to point out that this means we cannot say 
that the total ratio of that body will remain constant at 1:3 in this example, since the total 
acceleration will accompany a total decrease in rest, thereby changing the ratio.  
Secondly, Spinoza's letters to Robert Boyle via Henry Oldenburg on nitre tell us, 
significantly, that Spinoza believed that heat increases motion.69 It seems to be the case, 
Garrett argues, that individuals can “evidently survive even some quite considerable 
changes in temperature,”70 even if heat changes their mathematical ratio (i.e. it increases 
motion and decreases rest). Think of boiling water: we may boil it above 99 degrees, and 
it becomes a gas. In strict mathematical language, we can say that it has changed its ratio, 
and, therefore, its existence is not continuous. In other words, the water's physical ratio 
has changed.  
Matheron's position is similar to the one above. However, he reads Spinoza as 
attributing to the body both a material and formal element. The material element is the 
simple bodies, corpuscles, of which the composite is created, whereas the formal is “the 
                                                            
66 Garrett, “Spinoza's Theory of Metaphysical Individuation,” 83. 
67 PP2p22, 24-31.  
68   E2p13lem7. 
69 See Letters 6 and 13. See also Simon Duffy (2006). 
70 Garrett, “Spinoza's Theory of Metaphysical Individuation,” 84. 
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structure that gives the composed individual his unity and his uniqueness.”71 The material 
is, then, an aggregate; the form is the individual's intrinsic principle or the essence, of the 
individual. This essence, called the conatus (which I return to below), is the opposition to 
other individuals who could have been formed from the same elements.72 Even simple 
bodies deflect others from their path in order to persevere in being, and the more complex 
the body is, the more it can withstand change and persevere over time. Matheron suggests 
that, in fact, we should only consider the “total quantity of movement and the total 
quantity of rest that affects an individual.”73 
 This total is itself a mathematical ratio, but determined differently than it is in the 
straightforward account above. For Matheron, the sum total of the amount of mass and 
speed divided by the sum total of mass, whereby rest is identified with mass, gives us the 
total ratio of an individual that must remain constant to avoid damage, death or 
destruction.74 It is tempting to characterize Matheron's point to be simply that in order to 
maintain a static global speed, the equation excludes some motions. It is perhaps more 
accurate to say that certain motions can be transferred to and from different simple bodies 
within the whole to keep the fixed ratio stable. Matheron uses an example of the brain 
cooling to facilitate the muscles heating up during physical exercise, and conversely how 
the brain heats up while the muscles cool during drunkenness.75 For Matheron, this 
illustrates communication between parts, which is applicable both to the finite modes and 
to the total face of the universe. Moreover, he claims this reading of the “physical 
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interlude” allows us to consider various different modes as individuals: “a Cartesian 
whirlpool, the solar system, the Earth, a cyclone, a rock, a biological organism [or] a 
political society.”76  
 There are, however, some problems with Matheron’s account. The first is that it 
appears quite problematic to equate mass with rest. Garrett rightly comments that this 
does not take into account the requirement that the quantity of rest varies inversely with 
velocity.77 Surely it is not the case that as the velocity increases that mass decreases, even 
if rest does. When a bird takes flight, it does not ordinarily shed mass, just rest.  
 Secondly, Garrett finds fault with Matheron's explication of local motion.78 The 
worry is the same one as described above, namely that that the amount of acceleration and 
deceleration would have fatal consequences for complex individuals. For example, if I 
suddenly were to break into a sprint both the acceleration of motion and heat would result 
in my losing my nature and acquiring another, or my death. While there are surely 
instances where individuals die, or cease to be the individual that they were before, this 
criticism misunderstands Matheron's idea of communication between parts. 
 When discussing complicated individuals, like human beings, we intuitively grasp 
that part of our everyday processes, such as growing, ageing, eating, and producing waste, 
cause us to change, and, more importantly, that these changes do not result in a loss of 
identity or death. If we are to lose a limb or donate an organ, we continue as the same 
unique individual we were before the loss. Steven Barbone points out that this is a 
formula “reminiscent of Aristotelianism that the unvarying relation of motion and rest of 
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the parts be considered as the form (forma) of the individual,” which is roughly 
equivalent to the formal in Matheron's account above.79 As in Aristotle, losing or gaining 
parts, metabolic change, increasing or decreasing (growth and diminution) size, and 
movement from motion to rest and vice versa (locomotion) are all compatible with a 
changing individual that nonetheless remains itself through time. The ratio of the parts 
that an individual may lose either has the same ratio as the whole individual, or a different 
ratio from the whole. If the quantitative ratio of an individual changed it would obviously 
affect the totality of itself, and would, therefore, change the form of the individual. On the 
other hand, if these parts have the same ratio as the individual has, it seems to suggest that 
things lost are of the same nature as the individual.80 For instance, Garrett notes that it 
seems absurd to say that a strand of my hair has the same ratio as does my whole body 
and that the loss of a single hair is a loss to the total entity. However, the preface to Part 
IV of the Ethics indicates that while something may change in small degrees, this change 
in itself does not change the essence of the individual. When an individual changes from a 
greater to a lesser, or lesser to greater, perfection only then does it change its essence, as 
“horse is destroyed as much as it is changed into a man as if it is changed into an 
insect.”81 
 Garrett’s criticism is an epistemological one. He wonders how we are to know that 
an individual maintains a fixed ratio of motion and rest for its entire duration. The word 
individuum is not merely an arbitrary stipulation, so if we take Spinoza at his word, there 
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must be a way to account for how he knows this fact about individuals.82 Garrett wonders 
by what argument we are to grant that such ratios always occur, and occur in the right 
proportion. That Spinoza does can only be sheer speculation. Spinoza’s example of ratio 
of motion to rest in the parts of a horse as fundamentally different from the ratio of the 
quantity of motion to rest of the parts of a man or an insect does not offer a solid proof. 
Therefore, Garrett argues that solving this problem by speculating about the method of 
communication, and the regular occurrence of the right proportion, only exacerbates the 
second worry. Speculating seems to make an appeal to the idea of local motions of the 
parts using an epistemologically dubious path. After all, how are we to know that there is 
a communication, or motions, of the parts in the first place? 
 Garrett believes that he extricates Spinoza from both the mathematical and 
epistemological worries through understanding the notion of a fixed ratio in a less 
restrictive way. In reference to the epistemological problem, Jonathan Bennett suggests 
that the term fixed ratio be merely a “placeholder for a detailed analysis which [Spinoza] 
had not worked out, perhaps because it might involve a detailed anatomical and 
physiological theory of organisms which he knew was not yet available.”83 While the idea 
of a placeholder term does not fully answer the concerns above, Garrett does 
acknowledge and bracket what Spinoza could have known about the detailed functionings 
of individual beings. 
 Garrett imposes two conditions on the mathematical interpretation reading the 
concept of communication in the definition: 
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1) The parts that make up an individual cannot vary independently of one another. 
2) The motion and rest of these parts must conform to an enduring pattern (even 
though all the parts and their motion and rest can change roles). 
It is, of course, possible that an enduring pattern could be a mathematical formula, or that 
a mathematical formula could be one of many enduring patterns that exist. Letter 32 tells 
us “there is preserved in all together, that is, in the whole universe, the same ratio of 
motion to rest.”84 Therefore, it must remain fixed, but it need not be understood as an 
unchanging mathematical ratio. In fact, Spinoza writes, “each thing... always perseveres 
in the same state as far as it can,” which echoes both Descartes' law of inertia and 
Newton's definition of inertial force, but does not dictate the structure of the pattern.85 As 
such, Garrett argues that we should not take the remarks in the Short Treatise regarding a 
strict mathematical ratio as a serious hypothesis about the nature of complex bodies, “but 
simply as an arbitrary example of a pattern.”86  
 While the second point can be, I think, granted to Garrett, it is not so clear that he 
is correct on the first. Matheron's explanation of the internal communication of the body, 
which is the transference of both motion and rest among simple bodies, is compelling. 
Spinoza's own internal epistemological inconsistencies aside, it is clear that Matheron's 
equation of mass with rest is wrong, but his account of the spread of local motion 
throughout an organism is correct. Moreover, it is intuitively more believable. Say I begin 
a sprint; my ratio of motion to rest will have remained fixed in an enduring pattern so 
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long as I survive the exercise. I survive this because, as Matheron suggests, different parts 
of my bodies will possess different ratios to allow for acceleration and deceleration, along 
with changes in temperature. It is not the case, as Garrett characterizes it, that these local 
motions do not matter to the sum, but rather that we cannot take these local motions out 
of context. They do this together through communication, but ultimately each part is 
determined to motion or rest by other parts. What is clear is that the whole complex body 
does not change its ratio altogether, but through a hesitantly co-operative process. 
 In this section, I have demonstrated what a composite body with simple parts is, 
and argued for a plausible interpretation of Spinoza's conception of fixed ratios. Primarily 
through the work of Matheron and Garrett, I have argued that it is incorrect to assume 
mass is the same as rest, or that we ought to adopt Spinoza's claim in the Short Treatise 
regarding strict mathematical ratios. However, it is also problematic to reduce complex 
individuals to having an over-arching ratio that denies local communication in the simple 
bodies. As we continue to consider what the nature of the state-as-individual is in 
reference to the metaphysical treatment of individuals, we must pause to see what the 
implications are for the political. If, as I have suggested, we understand the individual as 
that which has a fixed ratio of motion and rest in the attribute of extension, it seems that 
that could carry over to a physical account of the individuality of the state as I have 
suggested in the introduction. Should we want to argue that the state is an individual, or at 
least a quasi-individual, it seems important to understand how it is to maintain such a 
ratio. Surely within a state, ratios of motion and rest change all the time, and as such it is 
the combination of local communications that must maintain this pattern. 
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2.3 Composite Bodies with Dissimilar Parts 
 In the previous section, I discussed both composite bodies with simple parts, as 
well as fixed ratios. Turning now to the final section of the “physical interlude” will allow 
us to explicate a more nuanced account of the composite individual with complex parts. 
Spinoza writes that we should “conceive a third kind of individual, composed of this 
second kind, we shall find that it can be affected in many other ways, without any change 
of its form.”87 This higher order individual has a more constant relation among its parts 
and has, therefore, a higher immunity from dissolution or loss of identity. Immunity to 
loss operates, for Spinoza, all the way to “the whole of nature,” which is one individual 
whose parts vary in infinite ways, without any change to the whole individual.88 
Interestingly, the simpler individuals that make up these higher order individuals never 
lose their own individuality for being a part of another, greater, whole than themselves. 
Before turning to the postulates in the “physical interlude,” I will turn to a more concrete 
presentation of individuals with the famous example of the worm in the blood depicted in 
a letter from Spinoza to Oldenburg. 
 Spinoza's letter is an attempt to answer some of Oldenburg's concerns about the 
notion of individuation. What this letter demonstrates is that individuals cannot be 
discussed only in isolation from the whole. To be an individual is to be a centre of action 
connected in various ways with a network of other individuals.89  
 “Each part of Nature accords with the whole and coheres with other parts,” 
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Spinoza writes.90 The actual manner of this coherence is beyond knowledge, he says, but 
reason compels him to hold these beliefs.91 Parts are similar to one another or share the 
greatest possible agreement. It is in their nature, then, to adapt to one another, which is to 
say that they are determined to agreement, just as fish are determined to exist in water or 
puzzle pieces form a larger mosaic.92 That there is difference among things creates 
wholes of varying complexity, of which our mind also forms separate ideas. Coherence, 
then, is defined as the least possible opposition between parts. 
 To clarify, Spinoza illustrates with an example. Lymph and chyle have so adapted 
themselves to one another that together they form the fluid of blood. As such, they are 
merely parts of the blood, but in so far as they are different from one another, they are 
also themselves wholes (i.e. as lymph and chyle). Spinoza continues his example to 
include a small worm living in the blood possessing sight with which to discern the 
particles and reason to understand their interactions. This worm thinks and behaves as a 
human being in the universe does, and sees the particles around it solely as wholes, 
instead of also being parts of the blood. The worm does not understand the more general 
laws that the blood as a whole obeys; it is, for the worm, a state within a state (imperium 
in imperio).93 Humans, like this worm, are often ignorant of the laws of nature and 
believe themselves subject solely to their own rational and normative laws. It can be very 
difficult for us to think themselves, for instance, as parts of a greater whole as it 
undermines their sense of self-determination. However, since the entire universe remains 
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constant in its fixed ratios, and no change can come from outside the totality of substance; 
the parts are therefore “solely determined by the nature of the whole.”94 
 This example tells us a great deal about individuals, the relationship of parts to the 
whole, as well as Spinoza's causal determinism. All particles of the same order determine 
each other, as, for example, lymph particles by lymph particles. Universal nature also 
determines these particles, say by the laws of gravity. Put differently, we can say that the 
causal determination of being hit by a billiard ball determines a second ball to change its 
motion, as well as being determined by the laws of physics that govern its motion after 
being hit and caused to move. This example demonstrates that particles are affected and 
are both passive and active forces, and further that individuals must be determined by 
both, whereby the laws of motion as active and the local determinisms of one particular 
ball hitting another are conceived of as passive. That this is the case must be true because 
finite modes themselves can never be an adequate cause among themselves, but neither 
can the laws of motion, or the infinite modes, be sole adequate cause. The local cause is 
passive because it follows from the active general laws.                                            
 
2.4 The Human Individual 
 With the worm in the blood example in mind, we can return to the final postulates 
of the “physical interlude.” In the postulates Spinoza writes, “the human body is 
composed of many individuals of different natures, each of which is highly composite,” 
and later notes that humans are composed of individuals that are “fluid, some soft, and 
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other, finally, are hard.”95 Moreover, the human body can be regenerated, and when it is, 
the process requires many other bodies. This is not meant to be a piece of science fiction, 
but rather, Spinoza means something much less fantastical, like healing a wound or 
growing out a bad haircut.96 The human body, as a whole, can be affected in very many 
ways from the outside, and it can move and dispose of external bodies in numerous 
manners as well.97 Bodies change from within, and in the case of the human body the 
composite parts that make up its form affect each other continually in a communicated 
fixed ratio. Similarly, humans affect other humans, other creatures, and eco-systems in 
just as many diverse ways. 
 
2.5 Conatus  
 Here we turn to one of the most crucial terms in Spinoza’s writings. For Spinoza, 
the animating force that drives things to persevere in their being is called the conatus. It is 
the power and essence of a thing to “persist in itself,” but the nature and place of a thing 
also constrain how far it can go in that preservation.98 Spinoza uses an example of a fish 
out of water; it cannot exceed its own nature by replacing its respiratory system so that it 
may breathe on land. The fish maintains fixed its own essential constraints at all times, 
just as much as a human does. In part three Spinoza writes, “no thing can be destroyed 
except through external cause,” and further states, “each thing, as far as it can by its own 
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power, strives to persevere in its being.”99 Here it is not clear, in any meaningful sense, 
that the thing in question is an individual, but what is clear is that it is not equivalent to 
say that a thing cannot be passively destroyed and that it actively strives to persevere. 
However, what Spinoza does demonstrate is that we must not think of conatus as a 
replacement for a sort of teleology.100 It makes no sense, for Spinoza's metaphysics, to 
say an individual does something for any larger reason than persevering. What we should 
say is that an individual does not do that which will hinder it. Our desire, or the force of 
our appetite, does not impel us to judge something good and seek it, but rather to seek it 
and then judge it as something good when it has not harmed us.101 That is, Spinoza’s 
claim distances himself from any Aristotelian claim that living (zên) is for the sake of 
living well (euzên), which is to say for a good or telos beyond the individual itself. 
Spinoza's position is also anti-Kantian, since it denies the separability of nature, body, 
desire, and reason that is at the core of Kant's critical philosophy. There is a more 
complicated story to tell here, but for now we will leave it as is. The doctrine of the 
conatus, as articulated at E3p7, tells us that the striving of a thing is that thing's actual 
essence.  
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2.6 Conclusion: Scope of the Theory of Individuation  
 Above I have described Spinoza's theory of individuation. Looking primarily at 
the “physical interlude” at E2p13 what emerges is unclear. The problem of ratios and how 
exactly they are fixed ratios certainly requires more clarification than Spinoza gives. It is 
a question worth asking what exactly this theory applies to. Spinoza's immanent ontology 
demands that there be a way to distinguish parts from whole, for if there were no such 
method then we would have to concede that Spinoza's substance is nothing but pure, 
undifferentiated mass, a night in which all cows are black. For many reasons, this is not 
an appealing outcome for his system, not the least because it would render his theory of 
individuation moot. While it has not been my project here to defend Spinoza's system 
against charges that it cannot demonstrate such a part-whole distinction, I have taken for 
granted that it does. Now, we can ask a series of questions of this theory: is substance an 
individual? Can infinite modes be individuals? What of inorganic bodies, or simple 
bodies? Is there a meaningful difference between being individuated and being an 
individual? Moreover and importantly given Spinoza's parallelism, what can this theory 
tell us about minds and ideas? 
 Substance, Spinoza argues, has no external cause and “for that reason it is to be 
inferred absolutely that whatever is of such a nature that there can be many individuals 
(individua) ... must, to exist, have an external cause to exist.”102 Therefore, substance is 
not to be understood as an individual. It naturally occurs to the reader here that perhaps 
this proposition renders the differentiation of substance impossible, since it is that 
differentiation that allows for individuals. It is important to bear in mind that attributes 
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and modes are real aspects of substance and not subjective human phenomena or 
metaphorical tools. That the infinity of substance encompasses differentiations excludes 
the possibility of dividing Substance realiter, rather it is differentiated modaliter only.103 
By this distinction I mean that we cannot split Substance, we can only speak of 
differentiation in terms of the parts, or modes, of Substance. So, while we cannot speak of 
there being a cause of Substance itself, there is causation within Substance of the very 
real components. Neither is there a vacuum. There is no gap between modes; substance is 
not an aggregate, but an encompassed whole. Understanding reality, then, as only parts is 
merely a misunderstanding of the proper order of things and their cause. A whole must 
not be thought as a static entity, but as fully processual. The definition and lemma 4 of the 
“physical interlude” both imply that individuals are bodies, and moreover, the definition 
also states that individuals are a “union of bodies or parts.” However, in returning to part 
one, we see that substance cannot be divided, “for each part will have to be infinite [and] 
the parts would have nothing in common with the whole.” 104 Further that, when 
considered from the intellect, substance is “found to be infinite, unique, and indivisible” 
and, therefore, cannot be composed of parts.105 That substance continues in its essence, 
and that there can only be one thing with that essence that exists necessarily and eternally, 
follows logically from Spinoza’s doctrine of substance monism.106  
 As mentioned above, Spinoza states that the “total face of the universe” and “the 
whole of nature” are individuals.107 What are we to make of this in conjunction with the 
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claim, above, that substance is not an individual proper? Spinoza frequently conflates 
substance, nature, and God as Deus sive Natura, which seems to lead us to the belief that 
substance is, in fact, an individual. Here, Spinoza's distinction between Natura naturans 
and Natura naturata is a helpful one.108 Natura naturans (nature naturing) is that which is 
in itself, and conceived through itself, which is to say that substance and attributes belong 
to natura naturans. Natura naturata (nature natured) is that which follows from the 
necessity of God. Subsequently, Natura naturata should be thought of as that which is 
modified and potentially an individual and depends on substance for existence, whereas 
substance remains unindividuated. In Letter 12, sometimes referred to as “The Letter on 
the Infinite,” Spinoza makes this same distinction in other terms. Natura Naturans is 
equated with Eternity, whereas we should equate natura naturata with Duration. Modes, 
in the realm of duration, are where parts exist, but in Eternity there are no parts, and as 
such no individuals. However, Spinoza remarks that the “total face of the universe is an 
example of infinite mediate mode of extension,” where motion and rest are the infinite 
immediate mode.109 
 Here another complication arises. Garrett aptly points out that the “physical 
interlude” shows that bodies are singular things and that singular things are shown to be 
finite and determinate.110 What can we make of the above argument that finds that the 
argument that an infinite mode is an individual? Garrett suggests that either we read the 
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“whole of nature” as exempt from Spinoza's previous claims, or else “the definition must 
regard the phrase corpus, sive individuum to broaden slightly the sense of ‘body,’ so as to 
include at least one infinite mode.”111 Garrett argues that we should understand Spinoza 
to be intimating the latter. The “whole of nature” is, while infinite, constructed solely of 
extended bodies; it is a composite body and is not, importantly, to be mistaken with 
substance itself. The finite bodies that compose nature might change, but the “total face of 
the universe” will maintain its fixed ratio. Moreover, no other infinite mode could be 
identified as an individual in the same manner without also being composed of the same 
parts. In the manner in which Spinoza describes the infinite mode no other individual fits 
this category. The nature of the infinite mode is, of course, a large debate in Spinoza 
scholarship. I have not intended to answer this question here, merely to highlight how it 
plays into the problem and gesture towards possible ways of understanding (or not 
understanding, as the case may be) the immediate and mediate modes. 
 On a smaller scale, it is still unclear whether this theory allows us to say that 
inorganic things, or the simple bodies (corpuscles) themselves, are individuals. It is my 
contention that inorganic, or non-living bodies are individuals for Spinoza, despite his not 
mentioning them as such explicitly. In the scholium of the “physical interlude” Spinoza 
writes that what is demonstrated is “completely general,” and further it does not “pertain 
more to man than to other individuals, all of which, though in different degrees, are 
nevertheless animate.”112 Here one must understand “animate” as that which possesses a 
conatus, which, for Spinoza, all things do. As such, we should want to argue that simple 
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bodies also possess a conatus. 
 According to the definition in the “physical interlude,” individuals are composite 
bodies with simple or complex parts. This definition seems to rule out seeing simple 
bodies as individuals themselves. Recall that for Spinoza there are no such things as 
atoms. Both Garrett and Matheron maintain that we ought to think of the simple bodies as 
individuals. Whereas Matheron finds simple individuals to be “pure events,” and, 
therefore, susceptible to death at absolutely any change in their ratio of motion to rest, 
Garrett finds them to be “internally homogeneous containing sub-regions which are also 
homogeneous, and able to withstand certain degrees of change.”113 It seems as if, on the 
one hand, bodies need to cross the threshold of simple to composite to be considered as 
existing things, and on the other that all things that possess a conatus are individuals. 
Though Spinoza never explicitly calls the simple bodies individuals, I am inclined to 
think that they are individuals in some sense. For Spinoza that term singular means 
something that has one effect, and though he refers to the simple bodies only as singular 
things Spinoza never gives the reader any indication that there is a set time frame for 
being an individual. Therefore, a simple body, though it only has one effect, strives to 
remain in being as all else does (i.e. has a conatus), and, therefore, ought to be thought an 
individual. That they should be thought of as individuals is the case even if they only last 
a nanosecond. 
 Above I have asked two further questions: is there a meaningful distinction 
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between individuation and individuality, and further, what can Spinoza's theory of 
individuation tell us about the individuation of ideas? These two questions will occupy 
the bulk of the third chapter. The larger question of this work demands that we have a 
clear position on the nature of individuals, both human and otherwise, before turning to 
Spinoza's key remarks in the Political Treatise.  
 In this chapter I have outlined the physical criteria of individuation of the simple 
bodies, complex bodies with simple parts, and complex bodies with complex parts. 
Further, I have investigated Spinoza's notion of motion and rest, fixed ratios, and the 
doctrine of the conatus. Finally, I have presented an overall scope of the theory of 
individuation highlighting certain problems, and some potential solutions. Recall that I 
want to answer the question: is the state an individual? Ultimately, I will not endorse a 
strict yes or no answer, but follow Balibar in thinking it is a transindividual. What I have 
demonstrated in this chapter, then, is that it is consistent to recognize the discrete 
individuality of simple bodies within complex ones, and complex ones within other more 
complex ones. All levels of individuals, then, can exist in simultaneous registers, though 
of course each level of individual will try to persevere in its being via the conatus. What I 
hope to have accomplished here is to have demonstrated an account of individuation that 
will position us to apply it to the above question. If an individual can be part of a greater 
individual, just as the worm in the blood is part of a larger organism, it should seem to 
indicate that citizens can be the parts of the state, and also that humans are individual 
parts in the whole of nature. 
In the following chapter, I will demonstrate that there is a difference between 
individuality and individuation, which hinges precisely on the role of the ideas within this 
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theory. To make this difference clear, I will examine the distinction between inadequate 
and adequate ideas, as well as turn to the concept of common notions. This individuation 
is a confused and imagined notion of discrete selfhood. As we gain adequate knowledge, 
however, I maintain that we do not lose our individuality. Finally, I will discuss this all of 





 In chapter two, I examined the fundamentals of Spinoza's theory of individuation by 
looking at the “physical interlude” in part two of the Ethics. In doing so, I demonstrated 
that the “physical interlude” breaks down three types of bodies: simple bodies, composite 
bodies with simple parts, and composite bodies with complex parts. These categories 
allowed us to have an important discussion regarding the nature of motion and rest, ratios 
of motion and rest, and fixed ratios of motion and rest. Against Matheron, I have argued 
that we should not conflate rest with mass. I have argued that motion and rest should be 
best understood as two elements of the same thing. That is to say, motion and rest are the 
two ways of being available to the attribute of extension, as it exists in time. In fact, their 
being is dependent on maintaining their ratios. Every individual is always both of these 
things to different and varying degrees. I have taken fixed ratios to mean a specific pattern 
that simple and complex bodies have and must maintain to remain the same individual. If 
that pattern changes it destroys the individual or it becomes another individual. This notion 
of ratio does not mean, when we are talking about the complex individuals, that we have 
harmony without difference. Finally, I have argued that the worm in the blood example and 
the final postulates of the “physical interlude” demonstrate that composite individuals 
constantly interact with each other at varying levels and in myriad complex ways. The 
individual, then, is never a fully atomic one. Therefore, as has been demonstrated above, we 
may justifiably say that no individual, simple or complex, is ever an atom; politically, the 
upshot is that there is no atomistic individual as envisioned in liberal political theory. 
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 In order to determine the complexity of Spinoza's ontological individuation, I will 
now consider further crucial elements of a Spinozist individual: adequate and inadequate 
ideas, common notions, and power. It is my aim in this chapter to investigate how the 
mental qualifications of individuality are demonstrable in tandem with the physical. In 
doing so, I will also return to a point from the previous chapter on the question of 
individuation and individuality. I argue that there is a meaningful difference between these 
two concepts for Spinoza, in that we always maintain our individuality, but as we approach 
the intellectual love of God, we see ourselves as parts in a whole and, in a manner of 
speaking, as participating in the totality of substance. Moreover, it is in the doctrine of the 
conatus that we find a bridge between them. Finally, at the end of this chapter I will briefly 
demonstrate how Spinoza's theory of individuation and individuality informs his ethical 
position, this individuation is a confused and imagined notion of discrete selfhood. As we 
gain adequate knowledge, however, I maintain that we do not lose our individuality. This 
positions us to move forward in chapters four and five to discuss the political implications 
of his theory. 
 
3.1 Inadequate Ideas 
 Part II of the Ethics, excepting the “physical interlude,” is dedicated to an 
exploration of the mind. I have suggested above that perhaps it is the case that Spinoza 
resorts to physical explanations where he lacks the language to express the notion of 
individuality and individuation of ideas and minds. Above, I have called this a trans-
attributal reading; meaning Spinoza uses the “physical interlude” as a model for how he 
will, by analogy, think individuation in the attribute of thought. The Cartesian physics that 
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Spinoza adopts, as well as his rationalism, set him up to dismiss the “occult qualities, 
intentional species, substantial forms, and a thousand other trifles” of a scholastic reading 
of natural philosophy and the nature of extension and thought.114 The human mind is 
capable of many things, and minds are so disposed as to be more capable the more complex 
they are, just as the body gains in power with great complexity. The mind, just as the body, 
can make errors and perceive inadequately. To begin to understand the notion of 
individuation and individuality in the attribute of thought, which I argue is instrumental to 
understanding the doctrine itself; we must understand the three kinds of knowledge in the 
Ethics. 
 Spinoza notes that there are four kinds of cognition, which give rise to three kinds 
of knowledge: 1) from singular things, 2) from signs, 3) from reason, and 4) from 
intuition.115 (1) and (2) are “opinion, or imagination,” which are prone to falsity, and 
generate inadequate ideas. Imagination is, for Spinoza, a bodily awareness. That it is so is 
not to dismiss his parallelism, but rather highlights the ways that we, when we try to 
understand via singular things and sign, do not have the correct idea in line with our bodies. 
Imagination and inadequate ideas are always incomplete. Reason (3) is based on 
conceptions of things “which are common to all, and which are equally in the part as in the 
whole” – the so-called “common notions.”116 Such conceptions are adequate, and reflect the 
formation of ideas of common properties of things. In understanding our particular idea, we 
begin to comprehend nature or God. Unlike imagination, sense experience cannot not 
provide all the information we need to form an adequate idea because senses only tell us 
                                                            




about something in a given time and space. An adequate idea, then, is one under Eternity 
and not Duration, and is, further, a belief that is known to be true, a priori.117 There 
remains great debate in Spinoza scholarship today over the nature of the common 
notions.118 Knowledge from intuition (4) is knowledge proceeding “from an adequate idea 
of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence 
of things.”119 This knowledge, then, arises from the intellectual consideration of the essence 
of an attribute itself, rather than from interaction of the modes of that attribute. Spinoza is 
obscure as to what, exactly, the intellectual love of God is. The intuitive essence of God, as 
well as our individual nature, is understood by apprehension, and not by any form of 
deductive activity.  
 Knowledge that arises from (1) and (2) are both sense-based forms of cognition. 
While it was not uncommon in early modern thought to base these two forms of cognition 
in bodily awareness, Spinoza goes further and maintains that they all have a parallel in the 
body (even if they are not sense-based). That which we come to know from objects, (1), are 
represented “through the senses in a way that is mutilated, confused, and without order for 
the intellect.”120 Spinoza calls these “experientia vaga,” vague or random experience.121 
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are those who read them as akin to natural laws. This camp takes Spinoza’s claim that motion and rest are 
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notions not a foundation for physics, but demonstrate what secure knowledge of modes in all attributes. 
For a fuller account of this view see Eric Schliesser (2011). I would like to thank Dr. Alison Peterman for 




That which we come to know through hearsay, (2), arises “from the fact that having heard 
or read certain words, we recollect things, and form certain ideas of them … through which 
we imagine them.”122 Knowledge from singular things and signs form the first kind of 
knowledge: imagination. Moira Gatens and Genevieve Lloyd note, importantly, that by:  
associating imagination with body, Spinoza does not downgrade it in relation to 
Mind. Mind's immediate confrontation with body is here seen as immediate access 
to something no less important, no less privileged in relation to ultimate reality than 
mind itself.123  
 
That said this knowledge remains, for Spinoza, relative or subjective, that is to say, 
inadequate (and it is the only one of the three that can be inadequate).124 Spinoza writes at 
E2p19 that, “the human Mind does not know the human Body itself, nor does it know that 
it exists, except through ideas of affection by which the Body is affected,” and further, at 
E3p28, “the ideas of the affections of the human Body, insofar as they are related only to 
the human Mind, are not clear and distinct, but confused.”125 It is clear, then, that he does 
not go so far as to say that there is no true knowledge that can arise from sense experience 
and mental imagery, but he does maintain that they are “mutilated [and] confused.” 126 
Furthermore, ideas arising from imagination are the sole cause of falsity. This is, of course, 
not to imply that there is a sort of trans-attributable causation at play, merely that it is 
through imagination that it becomes clear that both body and mind can make errors of 
perception.127  
                                                                                                                                                                                      
121  Ibid. 
122 E2p40s2. 
123 Moira Gatens and Genevieve Lloyd, Collective Imaginings: Spinoza, Past and Present. (New York: 
Routledge, 1999), 12. 
124 E2p28s, E2p41d, E5p28d. 
125 E2p19, E3p28. 
126 E2p41. 
127 This is a difficult concept that I am glossing too quickly to do it justice. There is no shortage of interesting 
 54 
 A Spinozistic dictum is that the “order connection of ideas is the same as the order 
and connection of things.” 128 As such, it is as if Spinoza invites us to consider the 
individual from two sides of the same coin. As we have seen above, other bodies directly 
affect bodies. They move each other, change each other's ratios, and are shaped by all 
motion and rest around them. The “object of the idea constituting the human mind is the 
body,” and just as the body is neither atomic neither isolated nor is the idea of that body.129 
Gatens and Lloyd argue that this “togetherness” is the basis of imagination – the ground on 
which imagination takes place. “The mind,” they write, “incorporates ideas of other bodies, 
and those ideas can involve awareness of transitions to greater and fewer states of activity 
under the influence of congenial and rival forces,” even if those ideas are themselves 
inadequate.130  
 That the mind can still regard things “as if they were present” demonstrates that the 
imagination gives us the ability to remember, in both a physical and mental sense.131 While 
the images themselves are only in the body, the mind represents these in thought, or that 
there is an imaginative representation of that bodily state. Juliana Merçon calls this 
“immediate awareness of local interactions.”132 Further, Spinoza writes that the ideas of 
affections, which have only to do with the mind and not the body, are “conclusions without 
premises, that is, they are confused ideas.”133 That is to say, we are often aware of various 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
and well-researched material on the topic. To enter the debates see Curley (1969, 1984, 1999), Della 
Rocca (1996), Schliesser (2011, 2012), Wilson (1980), and Yovel (1994). Again, I owe many thanks to 
Dr. Alison Peterman for bringing to my attention to the complexity of the common notions. 
128 E2p7. 
129 E2p13. 
130 Gatens and Lloyd, Collective Imaginings: Spinoza, Past and Present, 14. 
131 E2p17cor. 
132 Juliana Merçon, “Relationality and Individuality in Spinoza,” Revista Conatus Filosofia. 2007, 57. 
133 E2p28 and dem. See also E2p12. 
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physical effects on our bodies, but not their causes and, therefore, reach these conclusions 
without premises when we do not have true and adequate ideas. Having inadequate ideas, 
or rather their falsity and ability to deceive us, often leads to the denigration of senses. 
Without proper understanding and connections of causes and effects in both our minds and 
bodies, we lose the immediate awareness of the local interactions if we completely 
disregard imagination. 
 Louis Althusser's reading of Spinoza is helpful here, and can help tether us back to 
political concerns.134 Imagination fosters imitation and successive identification, and 
through this imitation and identification cultural norm are established and transmitted. 
Humans imitate each other and eventually identify these mutually imitated behaviours as 
the norm. For Althusser, imagination functions as an “apparatus” that performs two 
functions of ideology.135 The first function allows us to place ourselves, as the human 
creatures, at the centre of meaning, and the secondly, it reverses the order of cause and 
effect so “reality seems to be organized teleologically in the service of human ends.”136 
While there are important aspects of imagination that help us understand and remember 
ourselves and other individuals, the outcome is that ideas are not only the result of personal 
vague and mutilated experiences, but “collective fictions.”137 We collectively ascribe 
inverted effect to cause. The human individual is an illusion if taken to be the centre of 
meaning, and, therefore, this illusion creates false notions of cause and effect. However, 
                                                            
134 Louis Althusser (1976, 1997), see also Warren Montag (199), especially chapter 2, Hasana Sharp's 
Spinoza and the Politics of Renaturalization, chapter 2, and Peter Thomas (2002). 
135  Althusser, “The Only Materialist Tradition, Part 1: Spinoza” Trans. T. Stolze. The New Spinoza. Ed. 
Warren Montag and Ted Stolze. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), 1997. 
      5-6, see also Althusser (1970). 
136 Hasana Sharp, Spinoza and the Politics of Renaturalization, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2011), 
59, also Althusser, 6. E1app. 
137 Merçon, “Relationality and Individuality in Spinoza,” 57. 
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simultaneously the human individual is participating in a system of integration. Despite 
being fictitious, these illusions are necessary for the integration of individuality or of 
unique self-hood. The level of imagination is an inadequate understanding; reason and 
common notions, however, allow a human and other types of individuals to understand 
their mediate causal connections.138 
  Spinoza writes “inadequate and confused ideas follow with the same necessity as 
adequate, or clear and distinct ideas,” and while both adequate and inadequate ideas are 
equally necessary for Spinoza's system, falsity arises when a singular mind fails to 
understand clearly and distinctly (and as singular minds are necessary, so are their 
inadequate ideas).139 In other words, inadequate ideas are not normative in the sense of 
“bad” or “wrong,” and moreover, they often arise when we fail to understand the true 
causes of thing. The Althusserian account does not seem to allow for falsity to occur as an 
isolated phenomenon in a “singular mind,” as ideology is a shared cultural phenomenon for 
Althusser. We are never, as stated above, individuals in a purely atomic sense. However, 
“all men are born ignorant of the causes of things,” and we often imagine certain things to 
be good because they are desirable, even if that imagined good prevents us from coming to 
the true knowledge of causes.140 A potential consequence, on an Althusserian reading of 
inadequate ideas, is that, in refusing to see the true causes of things, which would allow us 
                                                            
138 See Matheron “L'anthropologie spinoziste?” Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger, 181-200, 
and Sharp, Spinoza and the Politics of Renaturalization, chapter 3 and 6. In this piece I will be speaking 
primarily about human individuals to set the stage for a discussion of human states. I do not wish to 
suggest, in speaking almost solely of humans, that we are the only kind of individual who experiences 
adequate knowledge merely that that is the example I use here. Similarly in the Ethics Spinoza speaks of 
the human because that is the creature whose ethical project he is interested in, and moreover, the only 
position he can speak confidently from.  
139 E2p36. 
140 E1app. I leave aside the broader question of human nature in Spinoza's writings. I share in the opinion that 
Spinoza is not, in fact, arguing for a unique or homogenous human nature with Sharp, Spinoza and the 
Politics of Renaturalization, chapter 3. See also Pierre-Francois Moreau (1994). 
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to recognize our communal participation in nature, we come to see ourselves as isolated 
individuals. Althusser's “collective fictions” are the outcome of a political experience rather 
than a metaphysical one.141 The individual dimension that is the focus of this thesis is often 
missing from Althusser's and other Marxian readings of Spinoza. My intent is not to reify 
an atomistic individual anathema to Spinoza's thought, but neither do I wish to lose the 
individual entirely to anti-humanism. Here, as elsewhere in Spinoza's quixotic writings, we 
should read on both registers. What should becomes obvious from the discussion above is 
that, so long as we are in possession of solely inadequate ideas, there is no way we can try 
to do so. Samuel Shirley wrote, “perspective was at the center of Spinoza's system. His 
thinking shows a passion for unity and totality, coupled with scrupulous fidelity to the 
integrity of the individual particular.”142 
 In the following section, I explicate the role of necessary and common adequate 
ideas in the conception of the extended individual. Finally, I will return to the third 
knowledge, intuition, or intellectual love of God or Nature. 
 
3.2 Adequate Ideas: Reason and the Common Notions 
 The first knowledge, imagination, furnishes human individuals with inadequate 
ideas. However, these inadequate ideas are not always false, and moreover, it is 
imagination that provides the capacity for memory and speculative thought. It is also what 
allows us social subjectivity and the ability to create norms. However, the second 
knowledge, reason, also aids in shaping our “collective fictions” while also enabling our 
                                                            
141 Sharp, Spinoza and the Politics of Renaturalization, 93. 
142  Samuel Shirley, Spinoza: Complete Works, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2002), 6. 
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ability to transform them. 
 When the mind understands things on the basis of reason, it is “determined 
internally, from the fact that it regards a number of things at once to understand their 
agreements, differences and oppositions.”143 However, knowledge of the second kind, that 
is to say, reason, is not a set of innate or endowed ideas. It is the power of individual minds 
to “generate ideas from its idiosyncratic, singular nature,” however they do not house “a set 
of stable, objective, eternal ideas.”144 Spinoza clearly demonstrates that adequate ideas 
express the virtue, or power, of individual minds, via their individual reason. Adequate 
understanding of the interactions either between bodies or ideas increases the mind’s 
power. Even if, as Gilles Deleuze says, common notions are biological understandings that 
allow the mind to understand resemblances and differences “from the inside,” or inherently 
from its own power, this does not create an atomic individual.145 The individual is never 
itself solely in isolation, that is, the power or virtue that a particular mind has in 
understanding cause and effect does not cut that mind off from the whole of nature. Rather, 
by understanding the proper order of cause and effect, and one’s place in it, individuals 
diminish their individuation by realizing their place in the causal order as well as their 
similarity with other beings, while they never sacrifice their individuality.146 I have 
mentioned the differentiation of these terms above and will elaborate on the precise nature 
of this difference below. For now, I wish only to imply that an individual mind or body that 
becomes powerful by sharing in the common notions has a dual action of individuating and 
                                                            
143 E2p29s. 
144 Sharp, Spinoza and the Politics of Renaturalization, 96. 
145 E2def 4. Gilles Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy, Trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Zone Books, 
1992), 278. 
146 E4p35. Amelie Rorty, “Two Faces of Spinoza,” The Review of Metaphysics, (1987), 312. 
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highlighting what are only perceived differences. It is a shift, in the Ethics, from the 
singular expressions of the imagination to the common notions that illustrate this 
distinction. 
 While Spinoza shows that the mind’s ideas of the body, its duration, and its parts are 
all inadequate, as is the mind’s idea of itself, he does not doubt the possibility of adequate 
ideas. Unfortunately, he does not provide explicit examples of the common notions, but 
they are said to be conceptions of things “which are common to all, and which are equally 
in the part as in the whole.”147 Because they are common to all (or at the very least to 
many), and occur both part and whole, they can only be adequate. The human mind 
conceives things adequately when there is something that is common to both the human 
body and the external bodies by which it is affected (be they human or not), and equally in 
the part as in the whole of each. For something to be common, for example, to a human 
body, it must be present in that human body and the external body that affects it, and in the 
affection itself. The mind, for its part, will have an idea of each body as well as an 
unconfused idea of the affection. It is not altogether clear what exactly comprises these 
common notions since they seem limited to ideas of extremely general features of physical 
objects. We might say, though, that extension itself is one of the common notions in that it 
is something that all finite bodies share. What is clear, however, is that when we have 
inadequate ideas they follow our particular bodily affections (which we intuit as having 
happened by chance or free choice), whereas the common notions exceed our particular 
situations. He notes that geometry is an excellent example of this deductive reasoning. 
 Since the common notions take place through the affections of bodies or ideas with 
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which we share affections, they can be local occurrences, which is to say, that they are 
often generated by spatial proximity to an individual body or the mind. Hasana Sharp 
argues that humans are locally affected in many ways, which, implies “humans can 
generate increasingly many common ideas by way of contact.”148 Sharp notes that the more 
diverse bodies and ideas affect each other at the local level, the more diverse they 
become.149 Our “agreements and differences” shape our reason and create a space for the 
richness of human diversity.150 She is correct to emphasize that the Latin Spinoza uses in 
E2p29s for agreement is convenientia (from convenio), which can be translated as “a 
meeting, a coming together, or an assembly,” and need not be read as conveying 
sameness.151 As humans approach the third knowledge, intuition or love of God (amor dei 
intellectualis), we recognize the similarities we have with others through our diverse 
engagements with them. As such, we never lose our individuality while we are alive (i.e., 
as so long as our conatus continues to keep striving for being in our unique ratio), but the 
more rational and adept, the more we participate in adequate ideas, the less we are 
individuated from one another. If the inadequate ideas obscure our ability to understand 
ourselves as both part and whole, then it is via the adequate ideas, or the common notions, 
that this starts to become possible. My aim here is to have travelled from the inadequate to 
the adequate to show the evolving way we come to think of ourselves as parts of a whole. If 
this is still somewhat obscure at this point, it will become clearer in the following section. 
 
                                                            
148 Sharp, The Politics of Renatualization, 98. Here, I take her to mean contact in the physical, as well as in 
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149 This is also clear from the postulates of the “physical interlude”. 
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151 Sharp, The Politics of Renatualization, 99. 
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3.3 Individuation vs. Individuality 
 In chapter two, I suggested that there is a meaningful difference between notions of 
individuation and individuality in Spinoza's system. His notion of inadequate and adequate 
ideas will help us understand this distinction. Inadequate ideas, we should recall, arise from 
mistaken, confused, and imagined causal relationships. E2p32 reminds us, “all ideas, 
insofar as they are related to God, are true.” As we have discussed above, this is because 
they “agree entirely with their objects.”152 In correctly understanding cause and effect in 
ourselves, and other bodies, we then correctly understand our place in God or nature. It is 
worth asking how exactly this effects individuation and individuality. 
 Beginning with Spinoza's account of the soul can be helpful. Above, I have laid out 
the ways in which adequate and inadequate ideas operate in general terms. However, it is 
worth noting that, for Spinoza, the soul is the very idea of the body. In the Short Treatise, 
he makes this clear. Our soul is the over-arching idea of body and is said to be immortal as 
our eternal essence.153 This is a good point to note, once more, that Spinoza uses traditional 
terms in a surprising and almost inverted manner. The soul, while our body maintains its 
unique ratio, is aware of the changes of our motion and rest. It is not a traditional view of 
the soul in that when our body dies, the soul no longer continues on with any remember of 
our essential selves. The soul itself does not retain any sense of us in the aspect of Duration, 
but continues to exist in the mind of God under the aspect of Eternity.  
                                                            
152 E2p32dem. 
153 E1p8, E4p29 and proof, E4p39note. When Spinoza was 23, a South American Monk visited him and 
reported that he, Spinoza, had been excommunicated from the Jewish community, in part, for holding that 
the soul dies with the body. See Curley (2002). 
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 When an individual thinks of its genesis in the correct manner it not only changes 
the “thinking of reality” but also the total reality of the individual's mind from inadequate to 
adequate. As such, the more an individual operates with adequate ideas, the more it is 
aware of its integration with nature. Of course, it also simultaneously becomes an 
increasingly active body during this process as well. The individual possesses, as a result, 
more adequate networks and relations. The very soul or idea of the individual expands to 
encompass a greater series of understandings. Just as the physical body is affected in a 
great many ways by a great many bodies and becomes more active, and thus possessing of 
an individuality, the soul of the individual experiences the same expansion. Heidi Ravven 
notes that:  
in absorbing the determining ideas, the distinction between what is internal and 
what is external to the individual are shown to be inadequate. However, it is 
important to note that as boundaries are reshaped in virtue of the mind's assimilation 
of the general order of causality, the original limited individual is reconfigured but 
its individuality is not extinguished – it is, indeed, enhanced.154  
 
Our bodies and minds are enhanced, on this reading, as we incorporate adequate causal 
understandings of ourselves. It is important here to recall the definition of adequate ideas: 
“by adequate idea I understand an idea which, in so far as it is considered in itself, without 
relation to an object, has all the properties or intrinsic marks of a true idea.”155 As the 
process of self-actualizing takes place there are no new elements being introduced to the 
individual; it remains what it always was. What takes place during an immanent 
transformation of the individual is that she realizes the common notion in her essence, 
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conceived only through herself, in the correct causal order that are shared with others.156  
 As Amelie Rorty notes, “as ideas become increasingly adequate, individuation is 
diminished (E4p35). To the extent that two individuals have increasingly adequate ideas, 
they are decreasingly differentiated.”157 Insofar as our bodies and souls agree, we overcome 
our differences and are able to mitigate the illusion of atomistic individuality. The lack of 
discrete individuality might be rather worrisome on two fronts. On the one hand, it may 
seem unappealing to think of our discrete individuality as nothing more than an inadequate 
understanding of our place in nature. Undoubtedly, we would rather believe we have 
correctly understood ourselves as a unique self. On the other hand, there is the worry that as 
we realize our sameness we erase racial or gendered differences. In such a way, certain 
others are instrumentalized because they are not “like us,” or we fail to recognize such 
distinctiveness in the first place. The conditions that generate racism, sexism, or other 
prejudices, among different humans are based in inadequate reasoning. Inasmuch as Rorty 
is correct, this implies a universal human nature, and entail that what is not like us is 
inhuman. It is true, for Spinoza, that we share in a nature that drives us persevere. However, 
if we are able to do so while embracing reason or the intellectual love of God, we realize 
that our perseverance lies in mutuality. That this is the case will become very important for 
Spinoza’s politics. It is almost important to note here the ways in which Spinoza diverges 
from the more traditional account of human nature as an exterior goal we should strive 
towards. For Spinoza, human nature is that which we are, which does include, and will 
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always include in virtue of our passions, anti-social behaviors and conflict. However, 
Rorty’s distinction between the individuation and individuality of a person is helpful to 
understanding what is at stake in Spinoza's theory, even if it is a dual register we inhabit 
that is often difficult to maintain in harmony because of our passions. Rorty’s reading may 
be a particular one though it obviously follows both Matheron and Balibar in spirit. It is not 
unusual, of course, to read Spinoza as a philosopher who is uniquely concerned with 
understanding the ways we who, as parts in a whole and as wholes with parts, participate in 
individuality and totality. 
 The doctrine of the conatus can speak to the first worry. The universal striving to 
persevere in being imbue in us a deep desire to avoid death, or the termination of our stable 
ratio. Sharp suggests that this instills in us the ability, which is certainly not always 
expressed, to be “mutually useful to one another.”158 Nevertheless, we do maintain 
ourselves in this striving, and it can be utilized in mutually beneficial ways. Moreover, the 
Short Treatise was written before the introduction of Spinoza’s theory of the conatus. As 
both Merçon and Ravven note, there are considerable contradictions found in the Ethics 
regarding the extendible character of the individual as I have tried to highlight above. There 
is worry that as the conatus becomes more active it will, in fact, increasingly separate us 
rather than bring us together as I wish to suggest in this chapter. Merçon and Ravven stress 
that a clearer picture of Spinoza's ontology, and subsequently his theory of individuation, 
can be found in the Short Treatise, despite, or perhaps despite the fact that Spinoza does not 
discuss the conatus there. 
 In the Short Treatise, the progression from the first knowledge to the second entails 
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that the soul loses its unique connection to its body's sensations. It proceeds from a local 
interaction with itself to an extension that unites it with other bodies. The preface of chapter 
two tells us that our bodies maintain a ratio in the face of their interaction with other bodies 
and that such changes cannot occur without our soul's awareness of it. Further, should our 
ratio be disturbed, this would mark the death for our body and the destruction of our soul as 
that which is aware of body in Duration, unless we have achieved adequate reflection in the 
form of divine love. In doing so, we have “been able to know and love this [substance] 
also, as well as that of extension; and uniting itself with these substances ... it has been able 
to make itself eternal.”159 Earlier, in chapter one, Spinoza notes “each thing in itself has a 
striving to preserve itself in its state, and bring itself into a better one.”160 There exists 
within each an impetus, a striving, to remain our own local individual, but simultaneously 
there exists a desire to dissolve oneself, in some sense, into adequate knowledge of God. 
That is to say, our striving occurs in both part and whole.161 
 Unlike the notion of striving in the Ethics, that is affectivity and the underpinning of 
emotion, the notion of striving in the Short Treatise appears more circumscribed. There, we 
strive either to maintain our self-identity in our connection to our bodily form, or we strive 
to consider ourselves as eternal within the whole of nature. The body is the first thing that 
the soul is aware of; it is the soul that is the idea of that body, in both parts and whole. 
Spinoza writes that this soul, or idea, “cannot find rest in the knowledge of the body” 
without becoming united, as one, in love. It is in this way we maintain our identity with our 
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bodily form. When we are able to understand adequately our connection to the whole, only 
then “can [we] truly say that we have been born again” in the love of God or nature.162  
Both Merçon and Ravven argue that this distinction between Spinoza's work pre- 
and post-conatus allows us to make an important distinction between adequate and 
inadequate conceptions of individuality. This debate has quite obvious implications for my 
overall thesis. Ravven writes, “group mind and the body politic are not mere metaphors ... 
even though they are surely inadequate both materially and conceptually,” and while she is 
correct in noting the movement of striving from the Short Treatise to the Ethics it is, and 
the problems it may pose for an expansive notion of an inter-connected individual. I argue 
that it is ultimately a mistake to suggest that the notion of individuality and individuation 
should be taken from the Short Treatise only.163 The more mature Ethics simply provides 
the clearer picture of his thought. Explaining individuality without the more robust notion 
of desire in the doctrine of the conatus cannot yet provide in the Short Treatise an account 
of the part-whole distinction, nor does it do justice to Spinoza’s more mature thought. He 
clearly thought that the introduction of the conatus was an improvement on his past 
thought, and it would be disingenuous to leave it out. 
 However, a part of Ravven's account of individuation and individuality is perfectly 
amenable to the doctrine of the conatus. That we are relational, permeable and expansive 
individuals is, I believe, the correct interpretation of Spinoza’s theory of individuation. 
Recognizing the importance of the conatus gives Spinoza's theory a deeper and more subtle 
explanation of the oscillation that finite modes experience between individuation and 
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individuality, which is to say the oscillation between inadequate, or imaginative, and 
adequate, or relational ideas, as well as those related to an intellectual love of God.  
 
 
3.4 Ethical Egoism and Relationality  
 As the postulates in the “physical interlude” demonstrate, the human body can be 
thought to consist of the organic and inorganic bodies that surround it, for all complex 
individuals are made up of other individuals that, despite being a part of another, larger, 
whole maintain their own integrity. I am affected and affect this computer on which I work 
and as such, during this process it is a part of my individuality. This fact would seem 
opposed to a certain Spinoza who writes, “when each man seeks his own advantage for 
himself, then men are most useful to one another.”164 Here, I wish to address the issue of 
ethics that emerge from the Ethics, and more precisely to address the issues of egoism and 
relationality. 
 Some argue that Spinoza's ethical system is Hobbesian in that it argues that human 
creatures are essentially egoist in nature, and further, that he advocates a primacy of the 
individual and a prudential naturalism. Hampshire, Bennett, and Nadler argue that Spinoza 
begins with Hobbesian egoism, but transcends this simple egoism with his notion 
intellectual love of God that sees beyond the isolated individual. Andrew Collier and 
Matheron contend that there is never truly an isolated individual to begin with, but 
something relational. I take Bennett, Steven Nadler, and Stuart Hampshire to be correct in 
maintaining that what we begin with is egoism that is, in a manner of speaking, transcended 
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through adequate reflection. However, I do follow Andrew Collier and Matheron in 
maintaining that there was never a truly isolated agent to begin with as should be clear from 
the preceding two chapters. Thus, we need to differentiate quasi-egoism from isolated 
individuality. E4p18s may be a useful place to look in order to understand Spinoza’s social 
relations. It will also serve as a good place to end our examination of the metaphysical 
writings and turn to his political treatise: 
We can think of none more excellent than those which agree entirely with our 
nature. For if, for example, two individuals of entirely the same nature are joined to 
one another, they compose an individual twice as powerful as each one ... Man, I 
say, can wish for nothing more helpful then the preservation of his being than that 
all should so agree in all things that the minds and bodies of all would compose, as 
it were, one mind and one body.165 
 
E1p17s says, “a man is the cause of the existence of another man, but not his essence... 
hence, they can agree entirely according to their essence.” For example, Alex and Jo might 
be the cause of their child, insofar as they are that child's parents, but they do not create the 
child's essence. While all humans are capable of agreeing in essence because we share such 
a similar essence in virtue of our species, later Spinoza reminds us that “insofar as men are 
subject to our passions,” we are not the same in nature, or that the passions can fracture us 
from one another.166 We are unable to do away with our passions, as they are a part of who 
and what we are, even as this means that we clash and are awful to one another. But if we 
follow the intellectual love of God, we can mitigate the passive and destructive 
consequence of our passions.167 However, Spinoza's reading of Genesis, particularly the 
story of Adam and Eve, clearly demonstrates that he does believe that it is possible for two 
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humans (as opposed to two simple bodies, or compound bodies with simple parts) to agree 
completely. He writes, “the man having found a wife who agreed completely with his 
nature, he knew that there could be nothing in Nature more useful to him than she was.”168 
The use of each other is a reciprocal endeavor that is both ethical and guided by reason, and 
not only by the passions. 
 The individual is always “in practice wider both in body and in mind than the 
bounds of a person's skin.”169 That said, we may in practice be wider than our skin, but that 
does not mean that we know or understand that we are part of a larger nature. To illustrate 
this claim, it is useful to turn to Spinoza’s definition of virtue. For Spinoza, virtue is not 
only a quest for personal salvation but also a project of the modifying the people around us, 
and aiding in transforming their character.170 Virtue is itself synonymous with power, and 
the more one is able “to seek his own advantage ... the more he is endowed with virtue.”171 
Power, then, is the preservation in our being and the active possession of adequate 
knowledge that one uses to influence others’ natures. That is not to say, however, that we 
can redefine virtue as egoism. Even the egoist will believe she can influence another’s 
nature. For Spinoza, the ethical element comes into play precisely as we extending 
ourselves for the betterment of others. While we begin with egoism in Spinoza’s ethical 
theory, the influence of our positive power is done in the spirit of love, joy, and friendship. 
“It is of the first importance to men to establish close relationships … and, as an absolute 
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rule, to act in such a way as serves to strengthen friendship.”172 In understanding the causes 
of the negative, or passive, affects in our lives we can hold back “hatred, anger, envy, 
derision, pride and similar emotions” and attempt to “repay with love or nobility an other’s 
hatred, anger, contempt.”173 One might say that true egoism, properly understood, is when 
we love others with the same love we give ourselves because we recognize their 
commonality we share in God. Adequate knowledge is power, and power is virtue. The 
virtuous individual for Spinoza is then knowledgeable and possesses power under all 
attributes, all of which are active states of being.  
 That which agrees with my nature is good, and this is by definition what is “good” 
for Spinoza.174 What is good for my nature is what enables me to participate actively in 
knowledge, power, and virtue. The good, therefore, is not what we tend towards, but is 
immanent to our own natural processes. E4p68s: “when man found woman, who agreed 
entirely with his won nature, he realized that there could be nothing in Nature more to his 
advantage than woman,” reminds us that, for Spinoza, the things that agree most with our 
nature are the things that most resemble us.175 For example, it is Adam who debases 
himself by imitating the affects of beasts, and is subsequently banished from Eden, as the 
rest of E4p68s tells us. It was with Eve that Spinoza believes he has the more perfect 
agreement, because she is human and therefore he will have the most in common with 
her.176 The virtuous individual, who is motivated by reason, will act in such a way that she 
promotes virtue and rationality in others, and in such a manner which their conatus and 
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power is increased and ours as well. In this way we can, potentially, strive together and 
“seek together the common advantage of all” and we can “compose, as it were, one mind 
and one body,” in solidarity.177 Once more I must stress the dual register always taking 
place in Spinoza's work. What is at stake is the navigation of individuation and 
individuality, and moreover, how an individual more complex than a human can be said to 
exist “as if” by one mind or body. 
 In this chapter, though I have covered much ground, I have given an account of the 
role of inadequate and adequate knowledge and how these forms of knowledge directly 
correspond to the formation of an individual. I have argued that to the extent that humans 
possess adequate knowledge they increasingly lose their discrete individuation. This 
individuation is a confused and imagined notion of discrete selfhood. As we gain adequate 
knowledge, however, I maintain that we do not lose our individuality. Our conatus is the 
element of ourselves that tethers us to our own individuality. Following this, I have given 
an account of virtue, power, and rationality as the key to understanding how humans may 
potentially join their active forces together. It remains to be seen if that potential can be 
actualized, or if it is a mere metaphor in Spinoza's system, or how to read the veluti 
distinction. 
 A few questions emerge from this account of the union of many people into one 
larger and subsequently more powerful, individual as “one mind and one body.” The ratio 
of such an enlarged individual would seem inherently difficult to maintain. Would the 
short-lived nature of such an individual compromise such individuality? Does an 
assemblage such as this possess a soul in the way a human individual does? Is it perhaps 
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possible that we can speak of this union in coherent metaphysical terms, but not in political 
ones? Is it possible for human individuals ever to agree enough in nature to join to create 
such an individual? In the following chapter, I begin to address this question by turning to 
























 In chapter three, I have examined the individual in expansive terms. It is clear that 
we can parse out a physical theory of individuation and individuality from the “physical 
interlude.” However, in appealing to Spinoza's parallelism, I have dedicated chapter three 
to the individuation of ideas and mind, having dealt with the body in chapter two. The 
prospect of explaining Spinoza's theory of individuation in terms of mind seems, on the one 
hand, quite easy. If the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and 
connection of bodies, then we can say that for Spinoza the process of individuation and 
individuality happens in the same manner.178 However we need to make this more concrete 
and detailed. 
 In the previous chapter, I have offered a nuanced view of the process of 
individuation and individuality from the side of mind. On my reading, the individuation of 
the mind hinges on the distinction between inadequate and adequate ideas. In having a 
correct understanding of the three kinds of knowledge in Spinoza, we can begin to 
understand his so-called ethical egoism as well as the ultimate underlying relationality of 
his system. Inadequate ideas result from the imagination, which, while useful, are the 
source of error. The egoism from which his ethics begins is thus based on imagined 
notions. It is inaccurate to view humans as Hobbesian agents who act solely from egoist 
and self-preserving desires through the imagination. While the Hobbesian account is not 
entirely untrue for Spinoza, it is not the whole picture – hence inadequate. The love of God, 
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that is, adequately understanding, which surpasses knowledge of the second kind that is 
restricted to the properties of common things and begins to illuminate the ultimate 
interdependence of our actions and the power of God or nature as the immanent cause. This 
third knowledge more clearly illuminates the massive points of connection between every 
individual, both in mind and body, and, moreover, contributes to diminished individuation. 
We become less differentiated the more we can understand our basic similarity through our 
involvement in substance. That said we never lose our individuality, merely gain the ability 
to see ourselves in a dual register. Our power lies in our passions, in our very desiring. Our 
conatus grants us our specific ingenium or character.  
 In this chapter and the next, I will begin to unpack how one can read Spinoza as 
grounding the connection between our preservation via the conatus and the community. 
Etienne Balibar's notion of transinidividuality allows us to understand the inadequate and 
adequate ideas as systems with different integrations. In inadequate systems, as I have said, 
we bounce back and fourth among different kinds of illusions, one of which is thinking 
ourselves as discrete atomic agents. In adequate systems, we can both recognize our 
specificity that lies in our differing passions and conatus while also acknowledging our 
fundamental commonality. My thesis is that our current political vocabulary does not allow 
us to understand Spinoza — even 400 years later since we are still stuck in this dualism of 
self and community. This leads to many one-sided accounts of Spinoza, even among his 
best interpreters.  
 This returns us to the metaphysical doctrine of individuation in the Ethics. There is 
ample proof in the text to demonstrate that it should not be considered simply as related to 
our physical embodiment. Moreover, Spinoza's parallelism demonstrates that even if we do 
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not find an explicit argument in his text to read the notion of individuation and individuality 
in metaphysical terms, it undoubtedly exists in the spirit of the text. There always has been 
a split between those thinkers who focus on his politics and those who focus his 
metaphysics. However there is a clear line between the two and the task here is to sketch 
that line with the hope of integrating the two, not merely to read them in parallel. Can we 
expand on Spinoza's metaphysical commitments to his theory of individuality through his 
political writings? I make clear the answer is yes. 
 Before turning to chapter five and the question of the state-as-individual, I want to 
address the individual within the state. The question of the part and the whole is no less 
significant here than the question of individual as part in the whole of nature. I wish to 
address the individual in terms of right and power (jus and potentia) very briefly before 
turning to a more detailed analysis in chapter five. In the TTP, Spinoza defines law, right, 
order, and power in the sections in which he makes an appeal to the notion of the individual 
(individuum). Laws, we find, demand in an “absolute sense” that each individual, or all 
individuals of the same kind, “behave in one and the same fixed and determined way, 
depending upon either natural necessity or a human decision.”179 This can describe laws of 
nature, social laws, or the individual to which they apply, and further it is sufficiently all 
encompassing. Laws always, in an absolute sense, compel individuals. 
 Definitionally, right and order are nothing but the laws of nature that dictate how an 
individual is to exist and to operate. The right of an individual, then, is the way it is 
naturally determined to be. Spinoza uses the example of fish to illustrate his point. Fish are 
determined to exist in water, to swim, and big fish eat smaller ones. The natural right of an 
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individual is coextensive with what is possible for that individual. A fish can no more exist 
out of water than can a human under water. Spinoza writes that this natural right is in fact 
the same thing as the power of that individual.180 One might worry that he repeats the 
Platonic view from the Republic that we each have by nature (kata phusin) a particular role, 
but rather it is the right of the individual qua individual to maintain itself; it does this “as 
far as it can,” and it takes “no account of an other's circumstance.”181 This is its “sovereign 
right” to persevere in itself.182 If an individual does not do these things, it ceases to be what 
it was before. It is determined to be exactly what it is or it faces destruction. Matheron is 
correct here to note that there is no circularity in claiming that what an individual is and 
what an individual does are, while different conceptually, the same thing.183 Moreover, the 
collective power of nature is the accumulation of every individual's power, or right, to 
persevere.  
 These same points as made in chapter two the TP. Spinoza writes, “the natural right 
of Nature as a whole, and consequently the natural right of every individual, is coextensive 
with its power,” and further every individual thing “endeavors to persevere his own being 
as far as in him lies.”184 In the Ethics, Spinoza is clear that this same power lies at the heart 
of an individual's essence, in her conatus. I have argued that as an individual attains the 
third kind of knowledge, it is the conatus that keeps an individual from dissolving entirely 
into the background of the totality of nature. If the foundation of an individual is 
synonymous with the activity of their being, then all individuals are necessarily determined 
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to exist and to operate in a certain way. 
 It is important to note the difference in the terms for power that Spinoza uses in his 
texts. When describing power as co-extensive with natural right Spinoza always uses a 
cognate of potentia, whereas when he is discussing authority, the power that is external to 
the essential power of the individual, he uses the term potestas. I can grant my power to 
another person in such a way that I give them authority over me, such as entering a social 
compact, or something more frivolous such as getting on a ride in a fair. In both cases, I 
lose some control over my situation, but I could never give away my more fundamental 
power unless I ceased to be an individual.  
 Spinoza tells us that this power is co-extensive with our nature is not something that 
is universally the same. In the case of the fish, this seems fairly obvious. My nature is quite 
different from the nature of the fish, and vice versa. However, this remains the case even 
among individuals who are far more similar than a human is to a fish. Once more we need 
to consider the implication of our unique fixed ratios and passions. To maintain myself in 
my ratio, I might have very different desires from someone who is in so many ways similar 
to myself. For example, I may require medication to function that my friend does not. 
Spinoza writes that we may conclude:  
It is not in every man's power (postestate) always to use reason and to be at the 
highest pitch of human freedom, but yet he always endeavors as far as is in him lies 
to preserve his own being and ... whether he be wise or ignorant, whatever he 
endeavors and does, he endeavors and does by the sovereign right of Nature.185 
 
Human beings, then, may not always have the ability to control their passions in such a way 
that they follow adequate knowledge towards what will best preserve them, but whatever 
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we do, we do in accord with nature. 
 A consequence of my reading of Spinoza's theory of individuation, as applied to the 
state, is obvious. Since an individual as much right as power, claiming the state is an 
individual forces us to adopt the same claim for the state. It seems that the state, operating 
by sovereign right, should just do whatever is in its power to do; however the parts of that 
state might suffer. The examples from history of such cases are multitudinous. The worry 
would be that Spinoza gives us no way normatively to critique these actions. His ontology 
seems to grant that such actions are nothing more than the course of nature. This is, I 
believe, true. Within Spinoza's politics, it is correct to say that all atrocities are part of 
nature, which is the implication of his immanence. However, that this is the case does not, I 
argue, determine all states to be cruel and unimpeachable for all time. Both the TTP and TP 
(but especially the TP) show Spinoza attempting to demonstrate that while many egregious 
actions are not unnatural, or even immoral, they need not take place. The global atrocities 
that many states have perpetuated are the result of inadequate knowledge, of an over-
indulgence in negative and passive passions. This is not to avoid the question of 
normativity. Spinoza’s writings are not devoid of explicit guidelines for action, and even if 
such concepts as “good” and “bad” are dependent on what is good and bad for us. His 
ethical writings do give us, as Michael LeBuffe notes, universal prescriptions for resisting 
passions, norms for agents insofar as they are rational, and norms for agents insofar as they 
are irrational.186 Moreover, his political writings, especially the TP give ample norms for 
different kinds of political constitutions. The whole project of the TP is, in fact, to explain 
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the most rational and least harmful ways to govern a state.187 
 This sounds as if the state is itself operating under the same conditions as is an 
individual human, that is, as I have suggested, other individual encompassed in Spinoza's 
definition. It is perhaps the case that states are particularly unstable individuals that do not 
maintain their unique fixed ratios with much success, relatively speaking, because just like 
other individuals they suffer immensely from inadequate ideas. However, in the final 
passages of chapter 17 of the TTP concerning the disobedience of the Hebrews and their 
failed state, Spinoza is rather explicit about what a nation is not: 
Was it by nature? Nature certainly does not create peoples, individuals do, and 
individuals are separated into nations by differences of language, law and morality. 
It can only be from these latter factors, namely law and morality, that each nation 
has its unique character, it unique condition, and its unique prejudices.188  
 
 It is, of course, a nation (natio) and a people (gens), not a state (imperium) that 
Spinoza writes of in this passage, but these remarks are important to bear in mind as we 
continue. If a nation is something like an artificial aggregate of human individuals, whereas 
the cyclone, or the totality of the face of nature, is an individual there are serious questions 
to ask of the theory of individuation. This is precisely what I will be investigating in the 
following chapter. In this chapter, I have pointed to a few key places in the political 
writings to which we should turn to find the links to the metaphysical writings in the Ethics. 
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Curley, for example, has suggested that the TTP should be read as a prolegomenon to the 
Ethics,  
Not only in the sense that it is an attempt to remove the prejudice standing in the 
way of an appreciation of the philosophical argument of the Ethics, ... but also in the 
sense that it is an attempt to present, in a less forbidding, non-geometrical form ... 
many of the teachings of the Ethics. 189 
 
I would argue that we could extend the same argument to the TP.190 The passages I have 
highlighted from both texts help us flesh out what an individual truly is in Spinoza's corpus. 
Turning to the explanations of the law, right, and power helps expand the notion of the 
essence of the individual. Having already argued that it is the conatus that is the key to the 
perseverance of all individuals, utilizing the political writings we can extend this to the 
larger question regarding the nature of the individual in the state. At first glance, it seems 
likely that all that we have examined in chapter two and three along with the key places in 
the political writing allows us to give an account of the state as individual in both physical 
and ideal terms. However, the TTP seems to make clear that, in fact, a nation is not an 
individual, but merely an aggregate.191  
    In the following chapter, I will address the issue of the state as individual much more 
closely. I first give an account of Matheron's naturalist interpretation, which sees the state 
as a true individual. From there, I move to the accounts of Barbone and Rice, who give a 
quasi-individual account. While they deny the state is a true individual, they do concede 
that it has many individual-like attributes. Finally, I turn to the work of Balibar to reframe 
these questions. Balibar argues that for Spinoza reality is composed of transindividuals that 
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are always already embedded in ever-widening webs of relations. In any event, this 
discussion builds on what I have shown in this chapter, namely that it is not only possible, 
but also imminently useful, to understand the expansive scope of the theory of 
individuation in Spinoza's work in political terms, via concepts of law, right, and power in 
the TTP and the TP, which is inseparable from his metaphysics.  It is my beliefs that these 
concepts help us understand more dimensions of what it means to be an individual for 
Spinoza. The human individual never leaves the state of nature, but is also part of a state, 
and how that changes and shapes what it means for human individuality becomes important 




Individuals and Community 
 
 The previous chapter leads us to a particularity difficult question in Spinoza's 
ontology: is the state an individual? That a state is an entity in a natural sense in Spinoza's 
thought is clear: “if many individuals concur in one action so that simultaneously they 
cause one effect, to that extent do I consider them to be a single thing.” 192 This is to say 
that the state, in so far as it is has one total effect, is rightly called a singular thing. 
However how can we best account for the nature of the state? One attempt would be to 
consider the physical dimensions of the state, say by its territory. For example, Canada 
has physical borders that change over time, and like a human body, it remains the same 
individual even if those borders change. If the rivers enlarge or dry up, new cities pop up 
or die out, etc., it remains the same state.193 On this account, Canada came into being as a 
new individual, perhaps in 1867, even if the same land (more or less) existed prior to 
Confederation, European discovery, or the existence of homo sapiens. States clearly have 
individual properties, and one can argue that this reading of the state would entail, 
because of Spinoza’s parallelism, that a state would also necessarily have corresponding 
ideas. Recall chapter 3.2 in the TP Spinoza writes, “the right of the state or of the 
sovereign is nothing more than the right of Nature itself and is determined by the power 
not of each individual but of a people which is guided as if by one mind.”194 Given what 
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we have seen in chapter four, namely that power, virtue and right all share a common 
place in Spinoza’s ontology; this seems to tell us that the power (potestas) of a state is 
one of a collective power. This is not a correct understanding of Spinoza’s texts. That said 
neither is it entirely correct to say that Spinoza is merely using a metaphor here. In this 
chapter, then, my aim is to explore contemporary readings of the state-as-individual in 
Spinoza’s texts. The general theme of investigation shifts here from a more thorough 
search in Spinoza’s texts, outwards to other interpretations of this problem. I do this by 
looking at three main types of interpretation. I call them (1) the naturalist or literalist, (2) 
the “quasi-individual” or metaphorist, and (3) the transinividual. 195 
 I begin with the naturalist position attributed largely to Matheron. His account 
begins from the physical to demonstrate the essence of the state, taking the same route as 
he has to explain the other physical bodies. This account sees the state as possessing a 
metaphysical status as an individual, and not being merely singular thing, this is to say it 
possesses a conatus. That an individual is both itself and its action has already been 
covered in chapter two, and it is by this idea that Matheron thinks that a state possesses a 
singular nature. It follows from its nature as both an active and striving thing that it fills 
the criteria of an individual. Matheron, and those that follow his analysis, argue we 
should read the veluti distinction literally: the state and the multitude (multitude) literally 
has one mind.  
 Contra Matheron's position, the individualist readings argue we should find that 
Spinoza intends his distinction to be taken metaphorically. In this section, I focus on 
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Barbone and Rice's accounts of how we ought to read the veluti distinction.196 This 
position argues that the state does, in many ways, operate like an individual. It, 
undoubtedly, has great power (potestas, not potentia) to act and affect beings as a singular 
cause. However the state ultimately would lack the correct right and power to be a proper, 
ontologically conceived, individual. These thinkers read the veluti distinction as 
metaphorical.  
 Following this, I turn briefly to French philosopher and historian Pierre-François 
Moreau. Though important in his own right, here he serves more to highlight the 
movement between the literalist and metaphorical positions and Balibar's transindividual 
explication. The last section of this chapter is dedicated to Balibar and his account of the 
transindividual. Balibar borrows the term transindividual from French philosopher Gilbert 
Simondon who argues from a shift from ontology to ontogenesis, thus changing the 
question from what exists to how it came to exist.197 He maintains that there can no 
longer be knowledge of individuation in the typical Kantian sense of the term, for we 
cannot grasp being in becoming without fixing it in the form of concepts, whose spatial 
and temporal consequences are already predetermined by the faculty of understanding. 
My aim in this section will not be, however, to cover Simondon’s research, but Balibar’s 
own use of the idea of tranindividuation. He finds in Simondon's work a way to highlight 
the ontology of relations that he argues are present in Spinoza’s work. For Bailbar, 
transindividuation displaces the question of human essence to practices among 
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individuals, and these practices constitute the being of the totality of individuals. Finally, 
I argue that Balibar’s account is extremely useful to explore Spinoza’s theory of 
individuation as it relates to contemporary politics. 
 
5.1 The Literalist Position  
 For Matheron, the problem of the state-as-individual begins squarely in the Ethics, 
and, as such, he grounds his account in an analysis of the Ethics. He does not turn to the 
political writings until quite late in his own book, L'individu et communauté chez Spinoza. 
As I have covered above, the definition of individuality that Matheron ascribes to Spinoza 
comes in two parts: 1) “the number and nature of the composing elements,” and 2) “the 
law by which they mutually communicate their movements.”198 When this definition is 
applied to the political, the first term becomes societas or something like an association. 
Human groups that live in a state are the number that compose and the nature the state-as-
individual. Matheron notes that there is societas in the state of nature as well, though such 
a state is anarchic and comprised of loose participation in unique and mutually beneficial 
circumstances. Even in the state of nature, however, there is a population and a ground or 
totality. The law of communication when it is extended to the political is roughly equated 
to the imperium or the power/rule of the multitude. The imperum is the base of the 
activity and power of the societas, or the elements that make up the state-as-individual.199  
 Both the societas and the imperium together form the civitas. The citizenry, 
civitas, is the societas that gains strength by the laws of the imperium or the laws of 
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communication (which, if we recall, is the maintenance of a mathematical ratio in the 
body). When a sovereign exits, she consists “primarily in this, that sovereigns are, as it 
were, the mind of the state,” or the mind of the imperium.200 As mentioned above, 
Spinoza's qualification “as it were” (veluti) here is a good formulation from which to read 
that debate over the nature of the state-as-individual. Matheron explains it thus: the 
sovereign, from the point of view of extension, is just one part of the social body, but 
from the point of view of thought, “the soul of the state coincides, if not with that of the 
Sovereign, then at least with the ideas that compose him, or its members.”201 There is no 
difference between juridical law and physical laws imposed by the sovereign at any level, 
except at the level of the total face of the universe.202 This is the only level at which the 
law cannot be broken. Matheron maintains that there are exceptions to juridical law, 
which is surely more easily broken than physical laws because “external causes prevent 
all from being able to conform totally to their natures.”203 However, applies equally to the 
physical laws And both kind of laws apply to the individual and the state-as-individual. 
All beings, for Matheron, no matter what they are, are constituted of a “closed totality” 
that furnishes them with relative autonomy, which is nothing other than their conatus. For 
Matheron, the state, just as much as an individual human, possesses its own conatus that 
drives it to act, and allows it to be acted upon. It is, therefore, the conatus that allows us 
to break both juridical laws (much more easily, of course) and physical laws. For 
Matheron, the total face of the universe, then, is not an individual because it cannot break 
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these laws via a conatus. 
 Matheron notes a difference at TP 3.2 “it is evident from ... the previous chapter 
that the right of the state or of the sovereign is nothing more than the right of Nature.”204 
Drawing this claim forward to TP chapter 4.1 he highlights the difference between the 
imperium and the summa potestas (the highest authority, or the rule of the sovereign). 
Here, Matheron uses the important disjunction (seu, sive, etc.) to extend the restriction of 
the use of the veluti in 4.1.205 In this way, he can suggest that the body politic be an 
individual with a soul, which is to say the idea that, when separated from the physical, 
will continue in the mind of God. While the sovereign does represent the state, as we have 
seen, it does so only in a limited way. The sovereign’s soul, which is ideational because 
the ideas that the mind perceives are the ideas of the affections in the body (l’événement), 
becomes the idea of the affections of the civitas. Understood correctly this soul can 
become the adequate expression of the ideas of the state. The sovereign clearly and 
distinctly understands the confused and muddle inadequate, or imagination, of the civitas. 
Matheron argues that the ideal expression democratic imperium, or as a democratic 
assembly, rather than republican representation. 
 According to Matheron, the state-as-individual is manifested in three ways: first at 
the level of institutions, secondly, on the level of individuals, and finally, on the level of 
other states. Therefore, it is susceptible to death, or losing its unique ratio, on all of these 
accounts. For a state to function, its institutions must all function reciprocally and adapt to 
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one another. It does not matter if these institutions are under a monarchy, an aristocracy, 
or a democracy; this is a basic set-up for all kinds of states. Like the human body can fall 
prey to the threat of the passive affects, these institutions are in danger of affects that 
hinder the correct formation of the state.206 In a similar fashion, individuals are 
susceptible to economic, ideological, or political moralities that can disrupt or destroy the 
state's conatus.207 Finally, outside states have a very straightforward effect on the state, 
and can easily damage or destroy the conatus of a state. To remain consistent in its ratio 
the state must form an internal institutional system as well as a system of morality.  
 Whereas the TTP focuses on the social contract, the TP largely abandons talk of 
the contract. Matheron thus emphasizes the TP over the TTP to argue that the contract is 
inessential to Spinoza’s politics.208 A multitudo in the TTP is created as a result of the 
natural inter-dependence of humans, whereas in the TP the multitude is always-already 
itself a natural entity. The literalist interpretation sees the laws of nature as having both 
force and validity in both historical realities and the physical individuals themselves.209 
Therefore, history is experienced as a law of nature by the multitude. This analysis 
favours the naturalism of the TP and leaves aside what Martheron sees at the rhetoric of 
the social compact of the TTP. 
 However, Matheron's reading does tend to leave out the rest of TP 3.2, which 
says: “That is to say, just as each individual in the natural state has as much right as is the 
power he possesses, the same is true of the body and mind of the entire state.”210 That this 
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is true of the body and mind of the whole state makes it difficult to attribute only 
inadequate representation of the state to the summa potestas. It is the general feature of 
the multitude, by sovereign right, that it incorporates all the powers of the citizens of each 
and every state. Matheron claims that the multitude must possess a sort of conformism for 
whom the most basic form of democracy is a “lynching,” and the power of the multitude 
is precisely that which ensures the safety of conformists and punishes deviants for 
threatening the mathematical ratio of the state-as-individual.211 
 
5.2 The Metaphorical Position 
 The metaphorical interpretation denies any metaphysical status to the state. 
Rather, the state functions as a historical collectivity, and there exists a rational basis of 
the affectivity of any state. The state can have many of the pieces that make up an 
individual, in Spinozistic terms, but lack a unifying conatus. Understanding the state as 
something like a quasi-individual, Rice and Robert McShea share the conviction that the 
metaphysics of the state is nominalist.212 This view, both politically and morally, leads to 
a radical individualism. Rice claims that it is a mistake to see this radical individualism as 
egoism as Bennett and others have. It is more accurate, Rice writes, to understand this as 
a methodological individualism. Drawing from later remarks in chapter 6, section 1, of 
the TP it is more plausible, Rice argues, to read Spinoza's use of veluti as part of his view 
that the state is an aggregate of many members operating in a unified manner, all based 
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on a principle of self-defense and mutual utility.213  
 Thus, aggregates of humans are not unified in any ontological sense but are 
merely historical aggregates with certain institutional tendencies. Rice wants very much 
to distance himself from the organicist reading of Matheron, which he sees as replacing 
all politics, and indeed, even the very possibility of politics, with ontology. If we adopt 
the literalist interpretation, Rice warns, we succumb to “the twin difficulties of 
totalitarianism and the metaphysical reification of social aggregates.”214 On the 
metaphorical account, what is taking place is not the process of individuation, but the 
process of harmonization. Drawing on his laws of human psychology, this occurs when a 
community realizes its reciprocal utility. We fear each other, but the fear of being alone 
and vulnerable drives humans to come together for the common advantage. This common 
utility, however, functions in such a manner that each in a harmonized society retains her 
potentia.  
According to Douglas Den Uyl, the notion of a super-individual fails on two 
accounts. First, Den Uyl argues that to advocate a super-individual ignores the 
omnipresence of nature. Individuals, no matter where they are in the order of nature, are 
always in the state of nature. On this account, a super-individual would be outside of the 
politics that are created by human psychology. In contemporary biology and physics the 
super-individual would be something more akin to an eco-system than a state-
individual.215 Eco-systems have their own laws, separate from human political laws, and 
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presumably from the laws of human psychology.  
 His second reason is ontological, though his view is not exactly in opposition to 
Matheron, for he also sees the individual as a set of relations. However, what the 
metaphorists set out to demonstrate is that these singular humans lack a group conatus to 
take them from the singular thing expressed in E2d7 to an individual in the “physical 
interlude.” Barbone uses the example of a flash flood. Water as well as various debris, 
such as plants, rocks and even animals make up a flood. Together all these things have 
one effect, and is properly called a rem singularem, or singular thing.216 The flash flood 
has no power in itself and no conatus. In this way, the summa potestas is not singular, and 
even if there is a monarch or an aristocracy, instead of democracy, the correct way to 
understand the ordering is as a harmonious (if the state is functioning well) set of 
relations. Harmony, then, is the mark of the state and not individuation. 
 Rice returns to the example of the worm in blood to make this clear. The worm in 
the blood shows us that the worm is most certainly an individual, and it is one because the 
activity at the lowers levels of individuality can be attributed to the laws of higher 
organisms, or the “hierarchy of laws which are related deductively so as to produce 
reduction schemata for the objects which fall under these laws.”217 Human individuals are 
subject to affective activity at the ontological level, but Rice denies that there are any 
such laws at the political level. In the TTP Spinoza writes that these sorts of laws, that is 
historical or political, “depend on the will of men.”218 The worm in the blood 
demonstrates the inter-dependence of causal laws. There exists a stratum of natural law 
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that binds the worm, the blood, and the individual at each stratum. According to Rice, 
however, the state has no such law. This is because the state is created from a set of 
individuals with no diversity, and therefore has no integration.219 The worm in the blood, 
according to the metaphorists, should be read as a political or social metaphor, not an 
ontological statement about the nature of individuals. The closest thing that can satisfy the 
requirements of a super-individual is the total face of the universe, or, perhaps, something 
like an ecosystem.220 
 The case that Barbone, Den Uyl, and Rice make is compelling and has intuitive 
appeal. However, in their account of the veluti distinction, the concept of a state seems to 
oscillate between two kinds of metaphor.221 The first extends the term individual. The 
second treats the metaphor to represent the pseudo, or quasi, individuals. The oscillation 
is unintentional and confuses the problem at the level of the original text and 
interpretation. On the former reading, there is a criticism of other readers of Spinoza, but 
those are separate from the metaphoric language Barbone and Rice wish to find in the 
letter of the text. In the case of the latter, Balibar argues that the actual expression in the 
text (una veluti mente duci) reverses the function of the distinction. Balibar claims that 
this reversal demonstrates not only that veluti resists Rice and Barbone's readings, but that 
it also resists Matheron's organism. In other words, Balibar claims that they all have 
misunderstood Spinoza. Balibar charges Rice and Barbone's position as suffering from 
another conflation, namely that Spinoza's nominalism converges with his politics to offer 
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a liberalism or libertarianism. In doing so, Balibar claims that Rice and Barbone 
presuppose Spinoza to be arguing that only particular individuals exist, and no universal 
entities such as a state exist in any real way. That is to say, the state operates with an 
illusion of “thingness,” when, in fact, it is only its laws. This methodological 
individualism is seen to echo the social-political individualism from the Ethics to the 
political writings because thinkers such as Rice and Barbone are suspicious of any unity 
superseding the classical liberal individual. 
  
5.3 The Transindividual Position 
 Before I continue any further with this analysis it is incumbent upon on me to 
mention Moreau, though I will not investigate his work in great detail here. Balibar casts 
Spinoza's interpreters mentioned above, Matheron, Barbone, and Rice, as dogmatic 
thinkers. They are such because they all insist that there is one correct understanding of 
Spinoza's thought that they hope to explicate. However, Balibar casts Moreau as a 
“critical” interpreter in that he attempts to create an account that confronts all these 
readings.222 For my purposes here it is helpful to understand how Balibar builds off of 
Moreau's critical interpretation to offer his own quasi-literalist interpretation. 
For Moreau, the question becomes a larger contextual one: how are we to 
understand Spinoza's theory of affects within a theory of history? Every state is made up 
of historically situated mores and values, which Spinoza calls ingenium and Moreau 
complexion.223 This complexion forms a historically situated form of nature, and 
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moreover, it is the natural limit of the power of particular collective identities. It is the 
peoples of a state that form the natural basis that adheres to the institutional limits of that 
power. Therefore, while a people create institutions, the institutions themselves also shape 
the people as a collectivity and are themselves the limit of the power of the people. As 
such, the state can be understood as an individual in a certain way. Moreau notes that the 
literalistic interpretation derives from a key remark made in chapter 5 of the TP: “men are 
not born citizen but must be made so.”224 The metaphoricist reading, on the other hand, 
depends on chapter 3 of TTP: “nature does not create peoples, but individuals.”225 Moreau 
argues that what is most crucial is that these do not address the same point. As seen 
above, the literalist position relies on an ontological claim, whereas the metaphorist 
position seeks to understand the function of institutions themselves.  
 Balibar classifies Matheron, as well Rice's, account of the issues of the state-as-
individual as dogmatic: “they all propose – although in opposing senses – that the 
solution lies immediately in a correct understanding of Spinozism that they aim to 
explicate.”226 Balibar takes Moreau to offer a critical perspective on the debate around the 
state-as-individual in that he, in some ways, seeks to answer the questions that the 
confrontation between the two camps. Balibar himself, on the one hand, emphasizes the 
communication and interactivity between bodies, and on the other, focuses on the 
political. In doing so, Balibar takes from both the literalists and the metaphoricists, and 
terms his own reading a “literalistic.” 
 In borrowing from the literalism of Rice, Balibar proposes that we need to look at 
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every instance of the expression una veluti mente ducitur (as if by one mind), no matter to 
what it is referring. In seeing that it does, in fact, apply to different things is part of the 
problem of interpretation of what Spinoza may have meant about the state-as-individual. 
Secondly, he argues, we should take into account all social, political and institutional 
corpus (body) references outside of this one expression. Doing so, Balibar argues, 
demonstrates how other expressions, such as corpus imperii (body of government), mens 
civitatis (mind of the state), and so on are also fraught and complicated by Spinoza’s use 
of veluti before these phrases. That the history of the “body politic” comprises legal, 
religious, and philosophical ideas is not, for Spinoza, theoretical but rather ideological. 
Since, for Balibar, it has this ideological dimension, starting from corporeal individuation 
is a dubious basis for a theory of individuation. Third, he suggests that we compare the 
occurrences of the expression una veluti mente ducitur with such expressions as ratione 
duci (guided by reason), ex ratione ductu (the reason of leadership), and so forth.227 What 
Balibar argues is that this distinction demonstrates that there is no univocal situation that 
una veluti mente ducitur covers, or refers to. Una veluti mente ducitur is, in fact, an 
alternation between affective mechanisms and the aim of rational utility. Finally, we need 
to juxtapose una veluti mente ducitur with what Balibar calls its “manifest antithesis” in 
the TP, ex suo ingenio vivere (from his own life or from his own self) that each citizen 
possesses.228 There is both a formal and substantial opposition in this contradiction. The 
formal opposition lies in the unity of the state and the “natural” independence of a people. 
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The substantial opposition “at the heart of the multitudo” that lies between the right of the 
individual based on ex suo ingenio vivere is self-destructive and, therefore, for Spinoza, 
impossible. On the other hand, the right that combines the ex suo ingenio vivere with 
communal right (and therefore power) “seems to deprive it of all but a virtual content.”229 
 Balibar's take on literalism departs from Rice and Barbone, as it is in the letter of 
the texts that Balibar wants to find an answer to the question of this curious expression, 
unlike Matheron who in many ways departs from the letter of the texts to extrapolate a 
perceived meaning. F Balibar suggests we investigate the problem he draws the 
conclusion that the “collective mens [mind] is for Spinoza essentially never anything 
other than the practical realization of an animorum unio [unity of minds]; in other word, a 
reconciliation or combination of ingenia [character, specifically that which emotional or 
passional reminder which is left out of mens].”230  
 What can we make of Balibar's method? Balibar draws on Moreau's method of 
critical interpretation of the text. To understand the reconciliation of the animorum unio 
and the ingenia one must, by necessity, take up “the passional dynamic of a mob,” or the 
affective nature of the citizens, with the “rational collective deliberation in the setting of 
stable institutions,” or the rational power of the state.231 In fact, this is why Spinoza 
advocates large-scale collective deliberation. It is his contention that the more voices that 
are entered into this space, the more likely it is that a conflict will be overcome.232 Balibar 
labels this process as “transindividual.” I may seem to go too far into the details on 
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Spinoza’s political process here, but I do so to highlight an example of normative advice 
on how states should run given from the metaphysical position of the transindividual. 
What I demonstrate here is that the collectivist interpretation, particularly as fleshed out 
by Balibar, can give us normative politics that, in some sense, privilege the individual 
human via their collective engagement in political organization. This might seem to 
suggest, to the detriment of my thesis, that this makes the distinction between literal and 
metaphorical understanding moot. If we can carry on our affairs, make normative 
judgments and organize out state in such a way to minimize conflict, what does it even 
matter if the state is an individual or not? I must confess I cannot give a satisfying answer 
at this point, other than to say that, for Spinoza, believed that the proper understanding of 
things through the intellectual love of God was the true path to freedom and blessedness. 
This is, of course, the subject of part five of the Ethics. This is not a path that all can 
achieve, and, therefore, having the capacity for adequate reason can allow for a normative 
platform without having reached the love of God. 
 Balibar, and many Marxist readers of Spinoza want to minimize the elitism that 
creeps in with this idea, in favour of the celebration of collectivity. This may be an 
oversight of these interpretations, but one I am bracketing here. In his lecture, “Spinoza 
from Individuality to Transindividuality,” Balibar argues that Spinoza's philosophy 
should be thought of as a relational ontology, or a “general theory of Communication.”233 
Individuals, in this relational ontology, are not given, but are constructed and are a 
posteriori to processes of individuation at multiple levels. Moreover, “their construction 
as well as their activity always involves a previous, originary connection with other 
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individuals ... a reciprocity of interconnected of interdependent processes of individuation 
and individualization.”234 E1p28 and 29 tells us that:  
Every individual thing ... cannot exist or be determined to act unless it be 
determined to exist and to act by another cause which is also finite and has a 
determinate existence, and this cause again cannot exist or be determined to act 
unless it be determined to exist and to act by another cause which is also finite and 
has a determinate existence, and so ad infinitum.235 
 
Thus, “nothing in nature is contingent,” and it is through these propositions that we 
should understand this communication. This is to say, the relationship between 
individuals is always a posteriori relationship. Moreover, this interaction is not derived, 
but an “elementary pattern of every causal action,”236 that always takes place between 
individuals. Therefore, Balibar sees Spinoza's theory as both anti-individualistic as well 
as anti-holistic. Balibar borrows the term, and much of its theoretical implementation, 
transindividual from French philosopher Gilbert Simondon and his book L'individuation 
pyschique et collective. Simondon, for his part, denies that his thought is Spinozistic, and, 
in fact, rejects Spinoza's philosophy as “a negation of individual reality.”237  
 The transindividual in Balibar's writing takes as its object the “way in which the 
more or less organized multitude 'perceives' itself ... In perceiving itself, it thus 'organizes 
itself'.”238 This process of transindividuality is not ideal or spiritual, but “reflects and 
articulates the power of bodies that comprise the multitude and its singularity, its 
particular ‘way of life’.”239 E4p18s demonstrates that the definition of the collective 
mens, or mind, is really a quasi-mens. This may well sound paradoxical. However, 
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bearing in mind his simultaneous claims for anti-individualism and anti-holisticism we 
can make sense of Balibar's claim. The “unity-of-action” of the mens can only be thought 
of “as-if” it is whole, as a quasi-mens. Mind, for Spinoza, is nothing other than the 
organized totality of its ideas, and as such, Balibar argues, the only way to speak of some 
unified action of a collective mind is with this distinction. We may say it operates as a 
mind, or as a mind, or even the action of a collective idea is, as it were, a mind. This is the 
case, Balibar argues, because individuals are unified in their tendency to action. Being 
unified in action, they can only be thought of in the “as-if” because an individual is 
nothing other than the “ensemble of ‘its’ ideas.”240 The proper capacity of the quasi-mens 
is to guide itself in a univocal way that gives rise to its internal organization. Without said 
organization, Balibar argues, it could not exist. 
 Balibar is right to address this, and it brings us back to thinking about the body. If 
this is all the case for the quasi-mens, what do we say of the body? If we follow 
Matheron, we need only to understand the physicalist body of the individual. It is clear in 
Balibar's account we can leave behind the physics of the Ethics. However, it is important 
to remember that the attributes, mind and body, are different expressions of the same 
thing. As such, we can no more think the quasi-mens as prior to the body politic as we can 
think the body politic as prior to the quasi-mens. As such, the rhetoric of the body politic 
here is unhelpful. This term “prescribes nothing by itself,” or perhaps only the ambition 
of the state to incorporate the multitude to the life of the state.241 As a consequence, we 
could say that without a minimum communal thought and incorporation into the state 




there could be no state.  
 It is important to return to Matheron's remarks on Spinozistic democracy: “the 
fundamental form of democracy is lynching.” The maximum communal thought and 
incorporation is a conformism that would be punishable by death, or exclusion, of those 
who do not conform. This is a very real worry about the outcome of Spinozist politics. 
Spinoza briefly treats this problem in his discussion of the monarchy in the TP. The 
state's attempt to create ultimate conformity can often generate extreme systemic 
violence, deep kinds of hatred, and state control of what kind life is valuable. The state 
and the multitude both attempt to create conformism under many guises, and a 
consequence of this is that such a state, that is a state that violently represses or engenders 
deep systemic injustice is fundamentally unstable. Further, Balibar argues that there is no 
end of communal thought, because ideas, thought, and mind are developing endlessly.242 
 What, then, is the state for Balibar? It is something that fluctuates between the 
multitudo, the imperium, and the summae potestas. Balibar maintains that they are aspects 
of the same thing, possessing the same conatus amongst them all. This is to say that we 
should refrain from attempting to essentialize the state. On Balibar's account, it is not 
possible to localize where the individuality of the state/multitude/sovereign power lies 
precisely because this was not something Spinoza was attempting to do. The fluctuation 
among these different facets may be expressed as an ethical or political effort, or 
something more like a duty. The notion of the political subject is, therefore, an ambiguous 
one.  
 Balibar's whole project of interpretation of the question of the state-as-individual 
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consists in more general queries about the nature of mens in Spinoza's work. However, 
we can say that, on Balibar's account, the quasi-mens is “the mental identity of a 
composed transindividual.”243 Unlike Matheron, who focuses on the physical and Rice 
who focuses on the nominal, Balibar believes the answer to this problematic lies in the 
consideration of mens and ideas, which is simultaneously a philological and historical 
project.244 As Spinoza's thought matures he tends towards an “analysis of the passions 
based on the logic of idea-complexes.” This philological and historical project, then, must 
look towards the ingenia and all that it emphases as that which is beyond the mens, or not 
captured by the word. Affects are, therefore, “radically intellectualized” as we try to 
understand what they are and what they do beyond the mens.245 It is not entirely clear, for 
Balibar, how the radically intellectualized passions are differentiated from adequate and 
inadequate ideas. One can wonder if the radically intellectualized passion, which is 
inadequate, is meant to be more than an imaginative fiction. The most likely case is that 
this should be thought of in Althusserian terms, the imagined collective fictions that a 
united mens engages in are, for example, the religious powers that Spinoza discusses at 
length in the TTP. These passional objects of the ingenium are practical. In many ways, 
then, the way to understand Spinoza's remark at TTP chapter 17 is that nature does not 
create states, but ingenium, people, or nations do this. The literalists find that this 
demonstrates that the state cannot be thought of as an individual because it is merely the 
aggregate of the ingenium, however, the relationship between the ingenium, the imperium 
and the summae potestas begins to capture the transindividual concept. What the 
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ingenium, and “smaller” individual humans are is the balance in the totalization and 
separation of the transindividual. It is within the ingenium that we can account for the 
movement of mental and physical bodies, or of attraction and repulsion. But all three 
function together to give us the particulars, their location or their affections, and the 
totality of their power.  
 It is beyond doubt that there exists in Spinoza's ontology a theory of individuation 
and individuality. This theory allows Spinoza to express the effects of substance, and to 
have a language to speak of the distinction of parts and the whole. Balibar is quite correct 
to maintain that it is very wrong headed and a fundamental mistake to think of this 
process of individuation strictly in terms of the human body and the human soul as 
Spinoza is quite explicit that there are both modes and individuals that are not humans. It 
is simple things, or res simplicus, which are expressed as having a cause and effect. In the 
preceding chapters, I have often used the human individual as a point of reference, but I 
agree with Balibar that it is a mistake to think of the process of individuation as merely a 
human experience, though, as Sharp notes, it is the only position a human creature could 
realistically be expected to be writing from. It is an epistemological impossibility for me 
to know what reality is like for a frog, a mushroom or a nuclear reactor. However, the 
“anthropomorphic illusion” is nothing other than an imagined way that humans often 
approach reality.246 Balibar argues that the political project is, therefore, the ultimate 
critique of this anthropomorphic illusion. This is because, perhaps paradoxically, it 
demands that the human be able to think outside the human and that we should avoid the 
over-determination by the imperium, the multitude, and the summae potesta. This is to 
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say, by avoiding these over determinations and radically re-thinking how and what it 
means to be individuated, Balibar adopt a new model of thought.247 The web of 
individuation that results can be applied equally to human life as to non-human life. The 
whole does not determine the parts, but the parts, through their mutuality, determine each 
other. For Balibar, the transindividual is always already “embedded in the life of human 
individuality” and our passional natures.248 The political project gives humans the only 
way to think, perhaps we might say, into different strata. Balibar argues that this is 
ultimately what the Spinozist sage is. 
 In this chapter, I have turned to current writings on the question of the state-as-
individual. Specifically, I have looked at the thought of Matheron, Barbone, Den Uyl, 
Rice, Moreau, and Balibar. First, I have examined the Matheron’s organicism. 
Problematically, Matheron takes an almost exclusively physical route to explaining the 
nature of the state's individuality, which does not properly address the place of both the 
TP and the TTP in Spinoza's corpus. The metaphoricists see the problem as, in many 
ways, an inflation of a supposed communitarianism. Spinoza's liberalism and nominalism 
deny any ontological state-as-individual, though the imperium, the multitudo and the 
summae potestas do operate in a potentially “quasi-individual” manner. Ultimately, 
however, their account conflates the use of metaphor in Spinoza's work with the metaphor 
at play in the work of Matheron and other literalists. Furthermore, they also 
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problematically conflate Spinoza's supposed ontological nominalism and his political 
liberalism. In direct opposition to the model that Balibar introduces, which argues that the 
collective, through its determined process of mutuality, creates and moves the whole, the 
literalists are accused of readings Spinoza to be delivering a theory whereby the 
individual agents, in their autonomy, are not only more important than the whole, but that 
the whole itself is a sort of illusion. Moreau offers a critical interpretation that seeks to 
find a more nuanced solution to this question counter to the dogmatisms of the previous 
commentators. Moreau describes the state as an individual characterized by association, 
integration, and adhesion. However, Moreau's arguments also leave some questions. His 
speaks obliquely of the ingenium, while at the same time utilizing it as a potential 
category to think one's way out of the problems of the previous account, and, moreover, 
he focuses too closely on the individuality of one individual within history and thereby 
ignores the difference of individuality and individuation. Finally, he privileges passions 
more than reason. While Balibar spends great energy explicating the passional, it is 
always clear that the rational is equally important. Balibar's account relies on the notion 
of the transindividual to understand the many vibrant and constant ways in which 
individuality and individuation take place within the tripartite of the imperium, the 
multitudo, and the summae potestas.  
 However, we are still left wondering what the actual implications for the political 
are. If it is the one project that can liberate humans from the anthropomorphic view that 
holds our imagination captive and allows political fictions to hold on with great might and 
bio-political force, how can we begin to participate in this? This is a huge question for 
Spinoza studies, and an important one for all manner of political thinkers. It would take a 
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whole second thesis to address this question, but let me draw to a conclusion by gesturing 
























Some Concluding Remarks on the Project of Spinozist Politics 
 
 This thesis has been an investigation into Spinoza's theory of individuation. I have 
argued to understand Spinoza's theory of individuation as a collective process, which 
helps us to uncover Spinoza's deeply inter-active social theory. To do so, we must begin 
with his substance monism. Departing from here, we find, first of all, the underlying 
commonality of all things. In doing so, we can reject the readings of Spinoza's ontology 
as atomistic. Doing so not only dismisses a reading of Spinoza as the founder of liberal 
individualism, but it also dispels the readings of Spinoza as an egoist, since there never is 
a unified and lonely ego to be empowered the individual, for Spinoza, is always 
assembling in webs of relations in which its historical and political milieu place it. His 
differentiation of individuals is, undoubtedly, the result of arrangements of the simple 
bodies, but these simple bodies are not themselves atomistic. Moreover, the construction 
of individuals always necessitates a multiplicity of different individuals at every level, 
and these levels each possess its own conatus, or power to persevere in its essence. 
 However that is not the whole picture. Owing to Spinoza's mind-body parallelism, 
we must also account for the individuation of the mind. I have argued, in chapter three, 
that in turning to the mind it becomes apparent that there are two different notions taking 
place in the Ethics on the subject of individuality: individuals and individuation. I have 
argued that an individual, at whatever strata, proceeds from inadequate ideas, or the 
imagination, to the common notions or the intellectual love of God: she realizes her 
fundamental participation in substance monism. As such, the more adequate ideas an 
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individual has, the less she sees herself as individuated, or separate. 
 The effect of this realization has notable implications for Spinoza's ethics and his 
politics. In the final section of this thesis, I have highlighted three contemporary views on 
the question of the state-as-individual. There is a great deal of scholarship on Spinoza's 
ethical theory as it relates to human beings. That there is this research makes sense, as the 
Ethics is a text for humans about humans. The ethical implications of the theory of 
individuation lie within that text, no matter how many disagreements exist in the literature 
regarding the exact nature of those ethics. However, I am more interested in the 
metaphysical implications of Spinoza's theory of individuation as it relates to his political 
writings.  
 His writings are not abundantly clear on what “a people guided as if by one mind” 
means. I have attempted to show three possible readings of this qualification. Ultimately, 
I argue that Balibar's reading of this distinction is the most plausible. The transindividual 
is not a straightforward understanding of the “physical interlude,” nor are its implications 
for individuality, but it is, I argue, promising.  
 Before closing, I would like to pose some further questions about the nature of 
“politics in a world without transcendence.”249 Where can a politic deduced from the 
metaphysics of individuation lead us? What, if anything, can it offer? How far can 
Balibar's reading of nature as history take us? Is Matheron correct to suspect that the 
democracy of the multitude is a lynching? Moreover, if, for Spinoza, democracy is the 
best arrangement for the power of the masses, how does the multitude attempt to rule 
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itself with the twin preoccupations of perseverance and fear? How does the multitude 
struggle against itself and discover the antidote to such fear? In other words, is a political 
community that does not fluctuate between love and hate, or our subjugation to our 
passions, possible or even desirable?250 
 As we see, moving beyond the anthropomorphisms that Balibar warns us of only 
begins to scratch the surface of a much larger set of questions. If we endorse Balibar, we 
must remain with these questions to envision a transindividual politics. Since, for 
Spinoza, there is no simple notion of teleology, the question is not what will the future-
politic look like, but how does a state that is continually engaging in both honest and 
dishonest processes of balancing individuality and individuation hope to promote the 
most ethical state. Undoubtedly, Balibar and all the other commentators on Spinoza's 
politics have imported their preferred politics into Spinoza's praxis. Balibar, at times, 
seems to forget that the conatus of individuals, especially masses, is variable, both active 
and passive, and without a particular path. At times, Balibar's account, I argue, is much 
more utopian than Spinoza himself would ever have endorsed. Balibar's own political 
commitments show through in his adoption of Spinozism.  
 There is an undeniable positivity in Spinoza's thought; however, it is foolish as 
well as dangerous to presume that a Spinozistic politics would be merely an active and 
on-going democratic process. These are idealized manifestations that we may have, and 
while they are fine, we cannot ignore that the quasi-mens is also a potentially dark, 
violent, and exclusive notion. Even if we are all interconnected through the mechanisms 
of relational communication as modes of God, the outcome is not always utopic. As I 
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mentioned above, our very relationality posits the transindividual and constitutes the 
danger of the transindividual. In the theory of immanence, there is no outside, and we 
should not romanticize this in Marxist terms. However, it is one thing to see the 
metaphysics as correct, and quite another to agree that the politics are ethical.  
 Take, for example, Spinoza’s treatment of women in the TP. Spinoza's position is 
such that he essentializes women as irrational, despite his ontological commitments that 
should lead him to deny such a human essence. We may go so far as to say that he denies 
women a conatus. As such, we are better to think of them as res singulares, as floods or 
boulders, mentioned in chapter two. Moreover, he excludes foreigners (peregrinos), 
servants (servos), children, and criminals from the state.251 If a majority of the people in 
the state is disassociated from power, or are only res singulares, not only can these people 
not change in the way any individual with a conatus can, but also it fundamentally 
changes how we are to behave ethically towards them.  
 It is tempting to return to Balibar here and note that this example is 
anthropomorphic, and therein is the problem. However, as Warren Montag notes, the 
theory of affects drags us back in regardless.252 Our imitation of affects, our shared 
mechanism of communication, has us spread affects “like a contagion.”253 Most often 
these affects are inadequate, the result of imagination. In a letter to Pieter Balling after the 
death of his son, Spinoza writes, “the effects of the imagination ... which have their origin 
in the constitution of the mind can have a confused presentiment of what the future is. So 
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it can imagine it as firmly and vividly as if such a thing were present to it.”254 It may be 
that those things we fear, or hate, can come to pass.  
 Despite his own writings on the subject, there is little metaphysical reason in 
Spinoza's system to deny women, foreigners, servants, children, and criminals their 
individuality and maintain that they have a certain deficient essence. As such, we should 
see the easy danger of the transindividual. The fear and hatred of these people and others 
can spread like a contagion. We have countless examples of this throughout history.  
 While Spinoza begins with God, his God is not an immaterial separate creator, and 
more importantly, his God denies the possibility of any ontological hierarchy: “Whatever 
is, is in God, and nothing can be or be conceived without God.”255 Everything that exists 
is part of God, and there is no longer room for dualism. Spinoza's God is not an 
Aristotelian ousia, for nature is pure actuality, a self-caused and immanent cause.256 The 
totality of nature is ambivalent, and there is no simple concept of teleology towards which 
it tends; as such, these contagions of affects are that which we always need to be 
cognizant of. If this is the case, there is still much work to be done on Spinoza's politics. 
This thesis takes these steps by analyzing contemporary readings of his work, while 
implicitly arguing that we must still engage with Spinoza’s thinking has. Spinoza is, as I 
mentioned above, a thinker of perspective. His philosophy affirms each individual’s 
precarious place in the world and enshrines each person with a desire to uphold themself, 
and further, endows them with as much power as they can amass by natural right. 
Simultaneously we grow stronger by joining together with others who share our natures. 
                                                            




Because this is a philosophy of becoming, we are always in new arrangements of power 
with one another, and the more we can form adequate ideas about these arrangements, the 
closer we come to intellectual love of God. There is nothing but existing things in webs of 
relation that can be constructive and destructive to our individual and collective power to 
persevere. The world politics that emerges from these metaphysics is anything but 
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